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Forgotten Borrowers: Protecting Private 
Student Loan Borrowers Through  
State Law 
Prentiss Cox,* Judith Fox,** & Stacey Tutt*** 
Private student loan borrowers arguably have the fewest protections of any users of credit 
in the United States. In a scarcely debated amendment to federal bankruptcy law in 2005, 
private student lenders gained the same protections against discharge previously afforded to 
federal student lenders. Yet private student loan borrowers received none of the rights available 
to federal student loan borrowers. These include income-driven repayment, relief from 
repayment on disability, loan discharge for fraud or closed schools, and public service loan 
forgiveness. Private student loan borrowers thus have neither the bankruptcy protections 
afforded to nonstudent loan debtors nor the repayment and debt relief rights of student 
borrowers under the federal loan program. 
This lack of consumer protection has particular consequence when considering the plight 
of for-profit school students saddled with private student loans. Some of the worst abuses in 
the proliferation of higher education debt have been perpetrated against for-profit school 
attendees. The vast majority of private student loans are cosigned, typically by older family 
members. This combination of private student loans and for-profit school attendance impacts 
a much broader range of consumers than would a comparable number of federal student loans.  
We suggest two types of state legislation to protect these debtors. For prospective  
for-profit school private borrowers, we propose incorporating some of the protections of federal 
student loans through the use of a state equivalent to the Federal Trade Commission “Holder 
Rule.” For all private student loans, we propose a requirement that private lenders engage in 
a mandatory settlement process, similar to those used by states during the recent foreclosure 
crisis, as a prerequisite to using state courts for debt collection.  
  
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INTRODUCTION 
Private student loan borrowers have the weakest consumer financial 
protections of any group of borrowers. They generally have no right to discharge 
their private student loans in bankruptcy, yet they have none of the repayment 
options and debt relief rights that accompany federal student loans. Unlike many 
other types of consumer lending substantially left to state law, such as payday loans 
or motor vehicle loans, state law protections for private student loan borrowers are 
nonexistent in most states. 
This lack of protection has particular meaning for higher education students 
attending for-profit schools. The fraudulent marketing and abusive lending 
practices in for-profit higher education is well documented. Also well-established is 
the history of state and federal regulators failing to control these abuses or, in many 
instances, actually abetting the proliferation of these schools. When these unfair and 
deceptive practices result in former students burdened with private student loans 
that lack basic protections, the result is a group of debtors who have been forgotten 
under consumer protection law. 
In this Article, we argue for two types of legislation that can be enacted by 
states to protect these borrowers. First, we propose the Private Student Borrower 
Protection Act, which would require a private student loan contract for attending a 
for-profit school to incorporate a specific set of rights afforded to federal student 
loan borrowers. We use the concept underlying the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) “Holder Rule” to accomplish this goal. This state legislation would apply to 
future private student loan borrowers attending for-profit schools. 
Second, we propose the Private Student Loan Mediation Act, which would 
require mediation before any judgment is entered for nonpayment of any private 
student loan. We use the successful mortgage mediation state laws instituted in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis as a model for this legislation. The proposed 
legislation would require private lenders to engage in good faith mediation, which 
the legislation would presume exists if the lender affords the private student loan 
borrower repayment and debt relief rights that are analogous to those provided in 
the federal student loan program. 
In Part I of this Article, we describe the daunting problem facing former  
for-profit school students indebted on private student loans. The number of private 
loans dropped during the Great Recession but are again on the rise. Students who 
attend for-profit schools find themselves with high levels of student loan debt and, 
more often than not, cannot qualify for the employment their school promised. 
Private student loans do not provide borrowers with the same protections that 
accompany federal student loans but face the same restrictions on bankruptcy. 
Congress left little legislative footprint in 2005 when it brought the massive volume 
of private student loans under the exemption from bankruptcy that had long applied 
to federal student loans.  
In Parts II and III of this Article, we set forth the structure and rationale for 
the two legislative proposals. We describe the existing regulatory frameworks that 
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we use for creating consumer protection—the FTC Holder Rule and state mortgage 
mediation laws. We then describe the scope of the laws and the specific protections 
that are afforded to covered borrowers. Finally, a model state law is included in an 
appendix for each of the legislative proposals.  
I. ABUSES AND MISSING LEGAL PROTECTIONS IN PRIVATE LENDING TO  
FOR-PROFIT SCHOOL STUDENTS 
Private student loans make up a small portion of the entire student loan pie, 
but it is a trillion-dollar pie.1 Even a small portion of such an industry can have an 
impact on borrowers and their communities. To understand this sector of the 
industry, it is first necessary to examine how it developed and grew to be such a 
force in student borrowing. 
A. Rise and Fall and (Partial) Resurrection of Private Student Loans 
The federal government first waded into the funding of college educations 
after World War II. The Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944 provided money 
for soldiers returning from World War II to get an education.2 The Higher 
Education Act of 1965 was the first to provide broad, needs-based financial aid in 
the form of grants, loans, and work-study programs.3 In 1972, the Pell grant 
program was created to provide more grants, as opposed to loans, for students. As 
a result, from 1970 to 1979, grants surpassed student borrowing.4 In the 1980s, the 
Reagan administration took several steps to shift the burden of funding higher 
education from the government to the student.5  
Most students obtain a federal subsidized loan better known as the Stafford 
loan. The size of the Stafford loan is regulated by the federal government.6 Students 
complete an application and the Department of Education calculates the “Expected 
Family Contribution.” This is the amount the student and her parents are required 
to pay. This information is then sent to the school, which calculates the cost of 
 
1. ELAN AMIR, JARED TESLOW & CHRISTOPHER BORDERS, MEASUREONE, THE MEASURE 
ONE PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN REPORT (2019), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/6171800/assets/ 
downloads/MeasureOne%20Private%20Student%20Loan%20Report%20Q3%202019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5VYJ-PZ2J ].  
2. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).  
3. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended at 20 
U.S.C. § 1070).  
4. Linda E. Coco, Mortgaging Human Potential: Student Indebtedness and the Practices of the 
Neoliberal State, SW. L. REV. 565, 584 (2013).  
5. Id. at 585–86.  
6. The banking industry has been lobbying recently to decrease the size of the graduate school 
and parent plus loans, which would invariably push more people into the private student loan market. 
While unsuccessful so far, these efforts have the support of Betsy Devos’s Department of Education. 
Christopher K. Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1624 (2019).  
First to Printer_Cox, Fox & Tutt_SS Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  9:45 AM 
2020] FORGOTTEN BORROWERS 47 
attendance. The federal subsidized loans and grants are set based on those costs.7 
The good news for students is that these federal loans do not require a credit check. 
Most students have no credit history and would not qualify for an unsecured loan 
of the size necessary to attend college. The problem, however, is that if the family 
cannot meet the Expected Family Contribution, the student and her parents are 
forced to try other options. Private student loans are one such option.  
Private entities have been involved in the student loan market since at least 
the 1960s. From 1965 until 2010, federal student loans were originated by private 
lenders, but backed by the federal government. Private lenders also offered student 
loans without federal guarantees, often as a companion to the federally guaranteed 
loan.8 This all changed in 2010 with the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act, 
which eliminated the private lender intermediary for federal loans.9 From 2010 
forward, federal student loans were made directly by the government to the student, 
resulting in a clear distinction between federal student loans made by the 
government with no private lender intermediary and a fully private student loan 
with no government guarantee or involvement, which is the subject of this Article. 
The private student loan market exploded and fell in tandem with the 
subprime mortgage market in the 2000s. It grew from less than $5 billion in 2001 
to over $20 billion in 2008, accounting for a quarter of all student loans that year.10 
The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA)11 afforded private student lenders protection against student-declared 
bankruptcy, something already enjoyed by federally guaranteed student lenders. 
There are two arguments for allowing this special protection in bankruptcy. The 
first is to bring down the cost of credit, or the so-called bankruptcy tax.12 The 
second is to decrease the risk to lenders, thereby incentivizing them to increase the 
available credit. A study of private student loans before and after BAPCPA 
confirmed the latter, but not the former.13 The number of loans increased 
significantly during the period immediately following BAPCPA, and the credit 
profile of the borrowers decreased slightly.14 However, the cost of the loans actually 
 
7. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS: REPORT TO THE SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND 
THE  WORKFORCE  10  (2012)  [hereinafter PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS ], https://files.consumer 
finance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MHK-PX8N].  
8. Id. at 9–13 (tracing history of private student loans).  
9. Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 1254 Stat. 107.  
10. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 17.  
11. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005,  
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.  
12. Xiaoling Ang & Dalié Jiménez, Private Student Loans and Bankruptcy: Did Four-Year 
Undergraduates Benefit from Increased Collectability of Student Loans?, UpJohn Press (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 175–76), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2332284 
[https://perma.cc/74LB-FZVW] (Mar. 12, 2018).  
13. Id. at 206. 
14. Id. at 213.  
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increased.15 As we saw in the subprime mortgage crisis, the amount of credit 
increased, but it increased at a significant cost to the borrowers. 
The Great Recession that followed had an immediate effect on this market, 
and both the size and number of private loans plummeted. In the 2010–2011 
academic year, they accounted for only seven percent of the market.16 Although 
modest, they are experiencing somewhat of a comeback. As of June 30, 2019, 
private student loans comprised 7.76% of the market.17 While this may seem to be 
a very small share of a market—too small, perhaps, to raise concern—it is important 
to remember the massive size of that market, for which 7.76% represents more than 
$124 billion dollars in loans.18  
Private student loans require credit checks, and as a result, the majority of 
private student loans have cosigners, usually parents.19 Parents can also apply for 
federal Parent Plus loans. These loans, though subsidized, do not offer some of the 
repayment protections offered by the loans made directly to students.20 Federally 
subsidized loans have fixed interest rates, though those rates can change.21 Federal 
graduate loans also have a fixed rate, though more expensive than undergraduate 
loans.22 Private loans have variable rates set based on the credit factors of a 
borrower.23 While all students who take out a Stafford loan at the same time will 
pay the same interest rate, if those same students take out a private loan, the interest 
rates can vary dramatically. An investigation by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) showed that most private student loans are more expensive than 
the corresponding Stafford loan.24 In addition, while the federal government covers 
the interest on federal loans while a student remains in school, the interest on private 
loans can begin to accrue the day the loan is made. 
Some for-profit schools became very creative in the way in which they 
financed student attendance. They attempt to bypass the federal student loan 
market altogether. This seriously disadvantages their students because the loans are 
more expensive and come without any of the repayment advantages of federal loans. 
 
15. Id. 
16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-430, PRIVATE STUDENT  
LOANS: CLARIFICATION FROM CFPB COULD HELP ENSURE MORE CONSISTENT OPPORTUNITIES 
AND TREATMENT FOR BORROWERS 5 (2019) [hereinafter GAO-19-430 ], https://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/700/699338.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFA5-G2PP].  
17. AMIR ET AL., supra note 1. 
18. Id. 
19. The number of private loans with co-signers has increased significantly post-recession. 
During the 2019–2020 academic year, ninety-two percent of private undergraduate loans originated 
required co-signers. AMIR ET AL., supra note 1, at 39.  
20. See infra Section I.C. 
21. The Perkins loan is the one type of federal loan with a statutorily fixed interest rate (five 
percent). However, no new Perkins loans have been made since 2017 when the program expired. 
Odinet, supra note 6, at 1629. 
22. Id. at 1630. 
23. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 12.  
24. Id. at 14. 
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The Minnesota School of Business and Globe University were two such institutions 
operating in Minnesota.25 The schools offered their students loans of up to $7,500 
at interest rates between twelve and eighteen percent,26 rates substantially higher 
than those available through the Stafford program. The students never actually 
received the funds. Instead, the money was applied to their tuition bill.27 The state 
of Minnesota sued the schools alleging they were not licensed in the state to make 
these loans and that the loans were usurious under state law.28 The schools claimed 
the loans were a hybrid product, not a revolving loan subject to the interest rate cap, 
but also not closed-end credit.29 As the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the 
loans were structured in a way that gave the schools “the benefit of open-end credit 
plans—charging interest in excess of eight percent—without providing the students 
the benefits of revolving credit.”30 The court determined the loans were usurious 
in violation of Minnesota law.31  
Innovative loan products can sometimes be beneficial, but as we learned in 
the subprime mortgage crisis, they are just as often used to disadvantage the 
unwary.32 We need to be more diligent when new products appear. One such 
product has recently entered the market, the income-sharing agreement. Purdue 
University, a public Indiana college, is the best-known university that has adopted 
this model, though it has been a favorite of abusive commercial driving schools for 
decades.33 The Purdue model is available to students in lieu of Parent Plus or private 
student loans. Like the schools in Minnesota, they claim it is not a loan.34 The school 
does not charge interest, although Purdue is careful to point out that you will pay 
back more than you received.35 That sounds like interest. When you graduate, you 
agree to repay the school a percentage of your income for ten years.36 The terms of 
the loan depend on certain underwriting factors but not those traditionally used in 
lending. Instead, the institution uses what it terms “education factors,” things like 
 
25. State v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., 899 N.W.2d 467, 468 (Minn. 2017).  
26. Id. at 469. 
27. Id.  
28. Id. at 469–70. 
29. Id. at 475. 
30. Id.  
31. Id. 
32. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE 
ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION & DECEPTION (2015) (explaining how if a profit can be made, then 
people will look for people to deceive).  
33. Income Share Agreements, PURDUE U., https://www.purdue.edu/dfa/types-of-aid/income-
share-agreement/index.html [https://perma.cc/GL8M-HRKW] ( last visited Sept. 27, 2020 ); see also 
Robert Farrington, Be Careful with Income Sharing Agreements (ISAs) to Pay for College, FORBES  
(Apr. 12, 2019, 7:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2019/04/12/income-
sharing-agreements-to-pay-for-college/#4aa7a7ea52e0 [https://perma.cc/4QLX-DCAW] (explaining 
why they may be more expensive than student loans).  
34. Back a Boiler Program Overview,  PURDUE U., https://www.purdue.edu/backaboiler/ 
overview/index.html [https://perma.cc/2B4H-QLD3] ( last visited Sept. 27, 2020).  
35. Id. 
36. Id.  
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your major, GPA, or SAT score.37 The school provides an online tool for you to 
compare your loan terms based on your major.38 Most students who enroll in 
Purdue will graduate,39 so perhaps for students attending this kind of institution, 
this is a funding option to consider. However, for-profit schools have abysmal 
graduation rates and even worse job placements. If this kind of lending spreads to 
that industry, there will be substantial negative consequences for students. 
B. Abuses in Private Student Loans to For-Profit School Students  
Private student loans should be a last resort, something a student enters into 
only when unable to fund his education through grants and federal loans. 
Unfortunately, this is not the reality. Some students never exhaust their federal loan 
limits, but instead go directly into more expensive private loans that do not offer 
the repayment options available through federal loans.40 While we can speculate as 
to why this occurs, one fact is suggestive. The CFPB determined that in 2008,  
forty-two percent of undergraduate students who attended a for-profit school took 
out a private loan, while only fourteen percent of all undergraduates had a private 
student loan.41 At every stage of the growth and collapse of the private student loan 
market, for-profit students have originated private loans at a higher percentage than 
other types of students. At the height of the private student loan boom in 2008,  
for-profit students were more than three times as likely to have a private student 
loan than other types of students (11.1% to 39.7%).42 By 2016, in the aftermath of 
the collapse of the private student loan market, for-profit students were still over a 
third more likely than other students to obtain private student loans  
(7.2% v. 5.3%).43 This relationship between private student loans and for-profit 
schools is significant and is the main problem this Article hopes to address. 
For-profit schools have used a number of deceptive practices to attract 
students, many of which involve deceptive student loans. Attorneys general from 
across the country have brought numerous actions to investigate everything from 
false advertising to falsifying student signatures on loan applications.44 
 
37. Odinet, supra note 6, at 1619–20. 
38. Comparison Tool,  PURDUE U., https://www.purdue.edu/backaboiler/comparison/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/ZJA2-MCMZ] ( last visited Sept. 27, 2020).  
39. Purdue Graduation Rate & Retention Rates,  COLL. FACTUAL, https://www.college 
factual.com/colleges/purdue-university-main-campus/academic-life/graduation-and-retention/ 
[https://perma.cc/2W8C-6ZZX] ( last visited Sept. 27, 2020).  
40. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 4.  
41. Id. 




44. See, e.g., NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS AND LAWSUITS 
INVOLVING FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS (2004–May 2014) 2, 12 (2014), https://www.nclc.org/images/ 
pdf/pr-reports/for-profit-gov-investigations.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FUW-2SPW]. There have been 
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Unfortunately, the Trump administration, led by Secretary of Education Betsy 
DeVos, has reduced oversight of for-profit schools and attempted to block states 
from taking action against bad actors, especially as it relates to federal student 
loans.45 Both President Donald Trump and Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos 
have deep and troubling financial interests in the for-profit education sector.46 
However, there are plenty of reasons for states to become involved when private 
student loans to for-profit school students are at issue. 
1. The 90/10 Rule 
For-profit schools have been the subject of inquiry for decades. The 90/10 
rule is the result of multiple federal investigations into fraud and abuse in the  
for-profit school industry dating back to the 1990s.47 The rule applies only to  
for-profit schools. It requires that any higher education institution must derive at 
least ten percent of its revenue from sources other than federal financial aid, 
including grants and federally subsidized student loans.48 The rationale for the rule 
was that, if the education was worth anything, others besides the federal government 
would be willing to invest in it.49 For-profit schools have complained that this law 
unfairly targets them.50 It does not apply to either public or nonprofit schools 
because it does not need to. Research done by the Department of Education shows 
that public institutions derive twenty-seven percent of their revenue from federal 
 
other lawsuits since 2014, most notably those brought by the federal government and thirteen attorneys 
general that forced the closing of Corinthian Colleges.  
45. See Danielle Ivory, Erica L. Green & Steve Eder, Education Department Unwinds Unit 
Investigating Fraud at For-Profit Schools,  N.Y. TIMES  (May 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/05/13/business/education-department-for-profit-colleges.html [https://perma.cc/H45P-
72MM]; Michael Stratford, DeVos Escalates Fight with States Over Student Loan Companies, POLITICO 
(Sept. 7, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/07/devos-student-loan-
companies-774599 [https://perma.cc/QQR4-MD9C].  
46. Tom Winter & Dartunorro Clark, Federal Court Approves $25 Million Trump University 
Settlement, NBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2018, 12:49 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-
house/federal-court-approves-25-million-trump-university-settlement-n845181 [https://perma.cc/ 
E3N2-HJVE]; Ben Miller & Laura Jimenez, Inside the Financial Holdings of Billionaire Betsy DeVos, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ( Jan. 27, 2017, 2:24 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/01/27/297572/inside-the-financial-holdings-of-
billionaire-betsy-devos/ [https://perma.cc/7PMY-TSTH].  
47. VIVIEN LEE & ADAM LOONEY, THE BROOKINGS INST., UNDERSTANDING THE 90/10 
RULE: HOW RELIANT ARE PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS ON FEDERAL AID? 3 
(2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ES_20190116_Looney-90-10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/985B-UULZ]. The rule was originally the 85/15 Rule but was subsequently 
amended to be the 90/10 Rule. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 
Stat. 448, 611, amended by Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112  
Stat. 1581, 1588. 
48. § 102, 112 Stat. at 1588.  
49. Kelly Field, Senators Mull Changes in 90/10 Rule to Rein in For-Profits, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Senators-Mull-Changes-in-90-10/126564 
[https://perma.cc/ESS6-8URB]. 
50. The Prosper Act, introduced by Representative Foxx of Virginia in 2017, would have 
repealed the rule. It has not become law, but the idea has not died. 
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aid and nonprofit institutions derive thirty-nine percent of revenue.51 For-profit 
institutions, on the other hand, rely on the federal government for ninety percent 
of their revenue.52 This heavy reliance on federal aid has led to abuses by  
for-profit schools. 
Corinthian Colleges have become the poster child for these abuses. In 2014, 
the CFPB sued Corinthian and a judgment was entered in favor of the CFPB a year 
later.53 The complaint outlines how the school used the 90/10 rule to burden their 
students with predatory private student debt.54 Corinthian students could not rely 
on federal student aid for more than ninety percent of the tuition.55 Therefore, 
Corinthian raised its tuition so that the maximum allowable federal loans would 
cover ninety percent of the tuition.56 The rest would then be covered by private 
“Genesis” student loans created by and for Corinthian.57 While the loans were 
originated by a third party, Corinthian had an obligation to repurchase the loans 
either immediately or if they became delinquent. More than sixty percent became 
delinquent. As the CFPB alleged in their complaint, colleges like Corinthian have a 
strong financial incentive to push these private student loans.58 Every dollar in 
private loans they induced a student to incur allowed them to receive an additional 
nine dollars in Title IV aid.59 
To fully appreciate how much Corinthian inflated the tuition, a comparison is 
necessary. In 2013, the cost of a bachelor’s degree at Corinthian Colleges was 
between $60,096 and $75,384.60 The same degree at Harvard cost slightly less than 
$55,000.61 A similar degree at a state school would cost about $9,700.62 No rational 
person believes that a Corinthian degree has more value than the alternatives. This 
is a common feature of for-profit education. They charge much higher prices for 
 
51. LEE & LOONEY, supra note 47, at 4. 
52. Id. 
53. CFPB Sues For-Profit Corinthian Colleges for Predatory Lending Scheme, CONSUMER  
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-
sues-for-profit-corinthian-colleges-for-predatory-lending-scheme/ [https://perma.cc/2QMW-6L36]; 
CFPB Wins Default Judgment Against Corinthian Colleges for Engaging in a Predatory Lending Scheme, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- 
us/newsroom/cfpb-wins-default-judgment-against-corinthian-colleges-for-engaging-in-a-predatory- 
lending-scheme/ [https://perma.cc/H3NV-MFFC].  
54. Complaint at 10, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Corinthian Colls., No. 1:14-CV-07194, 
2014 WL 5786691 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014).  
55. Id. 
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60. Id. at 8. 
61. Frank Olito, Here’s How the Cost of Harvard Has Changed Throughout the Years,  
BUS. INSIDER ( June 10, 2019, 8:57 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-cost-of-harvard-
has-changed-throughout-the-years2019-6 [https://perma.cc/C7TR-TEPF].  
62. COLLEGEBOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2019, at 12 (2019) [hereinafter 
TRENDS ], https://research.collegeboard.org/pdf/trends-college-pricing-2019-full-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z2B4-FNXF].  
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degrees than comparable public institutions. The Government Accounting Office 
did an investigation of for-profit schools and discovered significant tuition 
inflation.63 Some of the results can be seen in the chart below. 
 
Figure 1: Examples of For-profit versus Public Higher Education Tuition64 
 
The for-profit industry has long complained that this 90/10 rule is unfair.65 
The Brookings Institute recently studied the 90/10 rule and found the opposite to 
be true.66 According to their investigation, nearly all public (99.9%) and private 
nonprofit (95.7%) schools comply with the rule.67 For-profit schools, on the other 
hand, do not, with nearly twenty percent of the for-profit two-year schools and 
fifteen percent of the for-profit four-year schools relying on federal dollars for 
more than ninety percent of their income.68 Those private nonprofit schools that 
are failing are doing so primarily because of online and distance learning education.69 
In addition, schools with higher than 90/10 ratios—in other words schools that are 
relying too much on federal dollars—are of lower quality and have higher student 
default rates.70  
An undercover investigation of fifteen online programs at for-profit schools 
highlighted some of the quality issues for-profit school students face.71 At one 
 
63. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT  
COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN 
DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 18 tbl.3 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-
948T], https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZV7-8ST8].  
64. Id. at 18. 
65. See LEE & LOONEY, supra note 47, at 3. 
66. Id. at 16.  
67. Id. at 8 tbl.1.  
68. Id. at 6 fig.1.  
69. Id. at 7. 
70. Id. at 14. 
71. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-150, FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS: EXPERIENCES 
OF UNDERCOVER STUDENTS ENROLLED IN ONLINE CLASSES AT SELECTED COLLEGES (2011) 
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college, for instance, the test student was charged for a laptop when he enrolled.72 
The student told the college he did not want a laptop computer but was told to “fill 
out the ‘laptop agreement form’ anyway.”73 The student asked how to return the 
laptop, but got no reply.74 Of course, the cost of this unwanted laptop was charged 
to the student. The testers also documented instances of lax or inconsistent 
academic standards.75 Online education poses some of the most significant issues 
because it is so difficult to monitor. For-profit schools dominate the online 
education sector.76 The fundamental problem with for-profit schools is that they 
simply do not deliver a good product, especially considering its cost.  
2. Student Outcomes 
Studies have shown that people who attend for-profit schools do not fare well 
in the labor market. In fact, students who attend a for-profit school are more likely 
to be unemployed, and those who are employed earn less than comparable students 
who attend public or private nonprofit schools.77 Corinthian, like many for-profit 
schools, inflated its job placement statistics to entice students to enroll. The school 
knew its students had “[m]inimal to nonexistent understanding of basic financial 
concepts,” making them the perfect target for predatory loan products.78  
Many students who enroll in for-profit schools are first-generation college 
students.79 They are more likely to be poor and more likely to be minorities.80 
Communities of color “are more likely to experience delinquency or default.”81 In 
fact, ten percent of all black undergraduates attend a for-profit schools.82 All these 
factors made these students very vulnerable to abuse. The students are trying to do 
what they had been told to do to be successful, get a college education. Instead, they 
ended up with a nearly worthless degree and massive student debt—if they 
graduated at all. In 2017, the six-year graduation rate (the number of students who 
 
[hereinafter GAO-12-150], https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586456.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
H86W-J3LT].  
72. Id. at 9. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 7.  
76. See infra Section II.B.2. 
77. CAREN A. ARBEIT & LAURA HORN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., A PROFILE OF THE 
ENROLLMENT PATTERNS AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF UNDERGRADUATES AT  
FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS 3 (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2017/2017416.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/EJT7-E3XJ ].  
78. Complaint, supra note 54, at 3. 
79. ARBEIT & HORN, supra note 77, at 11.  
80. Aissa Canchola & Seth Frotman, The Significant Impact of Student Debt on Communities of 




82. TRENDS, supra note 62, at 32 fig.23A.  
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began their education in 2011 and completed it by 2017) at for-profit schools was 
only twenty-one percent.83 
For-profit institutions market heavily to military students. As a result, 
“[m]ilitary students constitute[ ] a larger percentage of students in for-profit  
four-year institutions than in all other institutions.”84 Military students bring unique 
financial benefits to for-profit schools. The federal government has enacted a 
number of programs that will pay for educational programs for both active duty 
soldiers and veterans.85 This is especially attractive to for-profit schools because 
these federal funds are not counted in the ninety percent for purposes of the 90/10 
rule.86 As a result, a veteran has used his or her entire GI benefit at a for-profit 
school only to discover the degree is worthless.87 This is more insidious when 
considered in combination with the heavy marketing done by the military to entice 
usually low-income minority enlistees with the hope of a free college education. 
Even as civilian enrollment in for-profit colleges declined, military enrollment 
increased.88 The University of Phoenix alone enrolled 50,000 veterans after the Iraq 
and Afghanistan deployments, earning $345 million in federal benefits.89 
We traditionally think of college students as young, recent graduates from high 
school. For the most part, they are.90 However, many older Americans have been 
encouraged—especially after the Great Recession—to go back to school to become 
better able to earn a living in the modern economy. Higher education is no longer 
seen as a broad opportunity to gain knowledge. It is viewed as being directly 
connected to your future earning potential. Older students are more likely to attend 
a for-profit institution.91 As a result, when labor markets decrease, enrollment in 
local for-profit schools increases.92 This makes sense, especially for older students 
who may have family obligations that do not permit them to attend schools farther 
from home. Lower-income students also attend in larger numbers, probably for 
similar reasons. Unfortunately, most students who attend a for-profit college are 
 
83. Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=40 
[https://perma.cc/FH2K-BYJ4 ] ( last visited Sept. 27, 2020). 
84. ARBEIT & HORN, supra note 77, at 6, 16.  
85. Christopher J. Salemme, Unpatriotic Profit: How For-Profit Colleges Target Veterans and 
What the Government Must Do to Stop Them, 32 BYU J. PUB. L. 89, 98–99 (2017).  
86. Id. at 101. 
87. Id. at 89–90.  
88. Id. at 91. 
89. Id. 
90. During the 2011–2012 academic year, 56.2% of all undergraduates were twenty-three or 
younger. ARBEIT & HORN, supra note 77, at 12 tbl.2.  
91. Id. at 2.  
92. See Luis Armona, Rajashri Chakrabarti & Michael F. Lovenheim, How Does For-Profit 
College Attendance Affect Student Loans, Defaults, and Labor Market Outcomes? 24 (EconStor, Working 
Paper No. 811, 2017), https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/189852 [https://perma.cc/ 
R4AW-K5W4].  
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worse off. They do not get the promised increase in income and they leave with a 
mountain of debt.93 
3. Deceptive Advertisement and Lead Generators 
The Government Accounting Office has conducted extensive investigations 
of for-profit schools.94 In one of its investigations, undercover testers were sent to 
fifteen for-profit colleges and found fraudulent practices related to the FAFSA 
application in nearly a third.95 Several schools were encouraging students to falsify 
their FAFSA applications to qualify for more aid than they were legally eligible to 
receive.96 Several of the schools refused to even discuss financial aid until they 
committed to enrollment.97 More significantly, all fifteen schools engaged in 
deceptive, even fraudulent, statements related to their accreditation, job prospects, 
and graduation rates.98 
Inflated and often fraudulent representations about job prospects and earning 
potential are among the most common questionable practices of for-profit schools. 
The research clearly documents that attending a for-profit school does not lead to 
the career advancements promised.99 This has not stopped the industry from 
claiming otherwise. Students were given false information about the employment 
success of its students. DeVry promised ninety percent employment in a student’s 
respective field.100 When the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigated, it 
found that the reality did not match the marketing.101 DeVry had a very loose—the 
FTC would say deceptive—way of measuring employment in the field.102 For 
example, one student with a degree in administration was working as a waiter and 
another with a degree in technical management was a clerk in a department store.103 
While DeVry denied the allegation in its settlement with the FTC, a look at its most 
recent employment disclosures shows a more realistic picture of its graduate 
 
93. Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Nicolas Turner, Gainfully Employed? Assessing the Employment 
and Earnings of For-Profit College Students Using Administrative Data 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 2287, 2016, revised 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22287.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/47CZ-Q4AD]. 
94. See, e.g., GAO-10-948T, supra note 63; GAO-12-150, supra note 71. 
95. GAO-10-948T, supra note 63, at 7. 
96. Id. at 8 tbl.1.  
97. Id. at 11.  
98. Id. at 9.  
99. See Cellini & Turner, supra note 93.  
100. Michael Vasquez, DeVry U. Accused of Using Phony Job Placement Rates, MIAMI HERALD 




103. Id.; Lesley Fair, FTC Case Against DeVry Yields $100 Million Settlement, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Dec. 15, 2016, 11:59 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-
blog/2016/12/ftc-case-against-devry-yields-100-million-settlement?page=2 [https://perma.cc/ 
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outcomes. Very few of its graduates are finding jobs in their field of study.104 In 
most cases, no one was employed and in a vast number of categories, fewer than 
one quarter of the students had found employment in their field of study.105  
University of Phoenix is part of the Apollo Education Group, one of the 
largest for-profit conglomerates.106 It recently settled a similar action brought by 
the Federal Trade Commission involving this kind of deceptive advertising 
practice.107 Unlike DeVry, University of Phoenix was not claiming certain 
employment numbers, just outcomes. University of Phoenix’s ad campaign featured 
companies like Twitter, Microsoft, Adobe, and Yahoo, leaving the viewer with the 
impression that its graduates worked for these companies.108 They did not.109 These 
are just a few examples of what has been a common practice in the industry: luring 
students with false claims of employment and financial success. 
Aggressive recruiting tactics that misrepresent the program itself have been 
another common practice in this industry. Attorneys general from numerous states, 
later joined by the federal government, sued Education Management Corporation 
(EMC) alleging, among other things, that it paid its recruiters bonuses in violation 
of federal law based on the number of students they enrolled.110 In addition, the 
schools offered certificates in fields when their programs were not accredited. 
Brown Mackie, an EMC school with locations in South Bend, Indiana, offered a 
radiology technology certification. The Notre Dame Clinical Law Center had 
numerous clients who acquired student loan debt to complete this degree. 
Unfortunately, the program was not accredited, and despite a need for such 
employees in the area, students who completed the course could not  
find employment. 
The Obama administration took action to curb these particular abuses when 
it enacted the gainful employment rule.111 In order to be eligible for federal student 
loan funds, schools were required to document that their programs met certification 
 
104. DEVRY UNIVERSITY EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME DISCLOSURES (2020), https:// 
www.devry.edu/d/graduate-employment-outcomes.pdf [https://perma.cc/HUP7-ULDJ].  
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106. Vicente M. Lechuga, Who Are They? And What Do They Do?, in FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES 
AND UNIVERSITIES: THEIR MARKETS, REGULATION, PERFORMANCE, AND PLACE IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 47, 51 (Guilbert C. Hentschke, Vicente M. Lechuga & William G. Tierney eds., 2010).  
107. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, FTC Reaches $191 Million Settlement with University of Phoenix 
in Deceptive-Advertising Probe, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019, 10:44 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/12/10/ftc-reaches-million-settlement-with-university-
phoenix-deceptive-advertising-probe/ [https://perma.cc/TNX7-9DCW].  
108. Id. 
109. Cellini & Turner, supra note 93. 
110. Stephanie Saul, For-Profit College Operator EDMC Will Forgive Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/us/for-profit-college-operator-edmc-will-
forgive-student-loans.html [https://perma.cc/FCB3-DGUY].  
111. 34 C.F.R. § 600 (1994); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Obama Administration 
Announces Final Rules to Protect Students from Poor-Performing College Programs (Oct. 30, 
2014), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administration-announces-final-rules-protect-
students-poor-performing-career-college-programs [https://perma.cc/2MGL-957X].  
First to Printer_Cox, Fox & Tutt_SS Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  9:45 AM 
58 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:43 
requirements and that a certain minimum number of their graduates found gainful 
employment.112 Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos and the Trump administration 
moved swiftly to protect their personal interests in the for-profit school market and 
repealed the gainful employment rule.113 Then, with virtually no pre-warning, the 
Department of Education changed its policies and announced it would no longer 
disclose records to law enforcement agencies.114 Attorneys general objected 
strenuously. Only by obtaining this information could attorneys general fulfill their 
role to protect the “nation’s student loan borrowers from unfair, deceptive, and 
predatory practices in the higher education field, as well as state regulators’ roles in 
licensing and supervising schools.”115 Clearly, Ms. DeVos is more interested in 
protecting the for-profit industry from the prying eyes of investigators than 
providing the attorneys general the information needed to protect students. 
Another troubling aspect of the industry is its use of lead generators to recruit 
students. The Federal Trade Commission recently took action against two such 
companies, Sunkey Publishing, Inc. and Fanmail.com, LLC.116 These companies 
created websites with names like navyenlist.com and armyenlist.com, which they 
populated with pictures of military men and women. Site visitors were asked to 
complete a “U.S. Army Information Request” with their name and other relevant 
information, as if they were applying to enlist.117 Instead, their information was sent 
to for-profit schools who informed them that the military really wanted to enlist 
them, but they needed a college degree first.118 Students were told not to worry 
about the costs, the school would lend the money.119 Through this fraudulent 
 
112. 34 C.F.R. § 668.403 (2014).  
113. David Whitman & Arne Duncan, Betsy DeVos and Her Cone of Silence on For-Profit 
Colleges, BROOKINGS (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/betsy-devos-for-profit-
colleges-education-america/ [https://perma.cc/BE9N-6VUF]; Diana Hembree, Investigations into 
For-Profit College Abuses Dismantles Under Betsy DeVos, FORBES (May 14, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/dianahembree/2018/05/14/education-department-dismantles-team-that-
investigated-for-profit-college-abuses/#d2977747ce0a [https://perma.cc/HP5K-RV9V]. 
114. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896; System of Records, 83  
Fed. Reg. 27587, 27588 ( June 13, 2018).  
115. Letter from Gurbir S. Grewal, Bob Ferguson, Xavier Becerra, Cynthia H. Coffman, 
George Jepsen, Matthew P. Denn, Karl A. Racine, Russell A. Suzuki, Lisa Madigan, Thomas J. Miller, 
Janet T. Mills, Brian E. Frosh, Maura Healey, Lori Swanson, Barbara D. Underwood, Joshua H. Stein, 
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Josh Shapiro, Peter F. Kilmartin & Mark R. Herring, Att’ys Gen. of New Jersey, 
Washington, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawai’i, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island & Virginia, to Betsy DeVos, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. ( July 13, 2018), 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/final_nj_wa_privacy_act_letter_7.13.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
46KQ-SPZ4].  
116. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Takes Action Against the Operators of Copycat 
Military Websites (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/09/ftc-
takes-action-against-operators-copycat-military-websites [https://perma.cc/UJ4T-53W6].  
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief at 35, 
United States v. Sunkey Publ’g, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-01444, 2018 WL 4282853 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 6, 2018). 
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scheme, many young men and women who had hoped to enlist in the military were 
instead steered to for-profit schools where they were enrolled in effectively useless 
programs that did nothing to improve their chance of enlistment. In fact, for many 
it hurt them in achieving their goal. Debt is considered a security risk and a proposed 
enlistee with too much debt will not be eligible for certain security clearances, 
barring certain career paths.120 
In a similar case, the FTC brought an enforcement action against several  
for-profit schools and their lead generators for setting up fraudulent websites that 
looked like job postings. 121 The websites would trick people into providing their 
names and other personal information, allegedly as a means to applying for a job.122 
Instead, the information was passed on to for-profit schools who used aggressive 
marketing techniques to convince these vulnerable people looking for a job that the 
way to become employed is to enroll in a for-profit school and take out thousands 
of dollars in loans.123 
4. Servicing Abuses 
Regardless of who originates a student loan, the federal government or a 
financial institution, a student loan is more likely than not to be serviced by a third 
party. Currently, three servicers dominate the industry: Navient (formerly Sallie 
Mae), Nelnet, and AES/Federal Loan Servicing.124 More than 13,000 complaints 
have been lodged with the CFPB regarding private student loans, many regarding 
servicing issues.125 NerdWallet analyzed the 2015 CFPB complaints and revealed 
that dealing with the servicer was the most common reason for filing a complaint.126 
In 2015, the CFPB issued a “Request for Information Regarding Student Loan 
 
120. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 710 app. A (2020) (“Failure to live with one’s means, satisfy debts, and 
meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide 
by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, 
and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.”).  
121. Lesley Fair, Settlement with Operator of Post-Secondary Schools Offer an Education About 
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https://www.credible.com/news/student-loans/big-four-student-loan-servicers-now-three/ [https:// 
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https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/?dataNormalization= 
None&dateRange=All&date_received_max=2020-10-04&date_received_min=2011-12-01&searchField= 
all&searchText=privatestudentloan&tab=Map [https://perma.cc/72H6-HHFP] ( last visited  
Sept. 27, 2020). 
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Servicing” and received more than 7,000 responses.127 Many of the comments 
documented servicing abuses and errors.128 Things have not improved since  
that time. 
The CFPB has taken action against several servicers for their practices in 
servicing both federal and private student loans. In an action against Wells Fargo 
Bank, the CFPB alleged the bank was engaged in illegal private student loan 
servicing practices that increased costs and unfairly penalized certain loan 
borrowers.129 The unfair and unlawful practices engaged in by Wells Fargo included 
“failing to provide important payment information to consumers, charging 
consumers illegal fees, and failing to update inaccurate credit report information.”130 
Ultimately, Wells Fargo was ordered to improve its student loan servicing practices, 
in particular the application of partial payments, which the CFPB believed would 
reduce the number of delinquent loans as well as the number of late fees.131 In 2017, 
the CFPB took similar action against Navient. While some of the issues in the 
complaint only pertain to federal loans, Navient has shown a pattern of activity that 
impacts the private loans it services as well.132 
Absent a meaningful stake in a loan’s performance, student loan servicing 
industry creates a similar principal-agent conflict that was seen during the mortgage 
crisis in which servicers’ incentives diverge from that of investors.133 The market 
was unable to “self-correct because neither [the mortgage] investors nor affected 
homeowners ha[d] the incentives or the bargaining power to fix the system.”134  
As a group, student loan borrowers are even more vulnerable. They are 
disproportionately underrepresented and need better consumer protections. In fact, 
“research suggests higher rates of student loan defaults and delinquencies in ZIP 
codes populated primarily by minorities with higher income levels.”135 These 
 
127. 80 Fed. Reg. 29302 (May 21, 2015); CFPB Publishes Over 7,700 Consumer Complaint 
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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324023 [https://perma.cc/6WEN-URGD]. 
134. Id. 
135. Canchola & Frotman, supra note 80.  
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statistics “raise concerns that millions of borrowers may not be getting information 
about repayment options or may encounter breakdowns when attempting to enroll 
in these plans.”136  
As mentioned previously, for-profit schools aggressively market to military 
students and, as a result, have a disproportionate number of military borrowers. 
When a servicemember is on active duty, he or she is eligible for an interest rate 
reduction to six percent.137 Servicers have also illegally required active duty military 
personnel to reapply or update the loan servicer periodically in order to maintain 
the interest rate deduction.138 A servicemember in a war zone certainly does not 
have access to the documentation being demanded by the servicer. The servicers 
create unnecessary, and often illegal, hurdles to prevent servicemembers from 
accessing the rights federal law affords them.139 
C. Lack of Rights Under Existing Law 
For-profit school borrowers with private student loans face a unique lack of 
rights under federal and state law. Section I.C.1 discusses the difference between 
the rights given to borrowers of federal student loans versus the limited rights and 
resources available for private student loan borrowers. Section I.C.2 places this 
relative difference in the context of the bankruptcy discharge exception faced by all 
student loan borrowers. 
1. Private Student Loan Borrowers Lack Protections Afforded to Federal Student  
Loan Borrowers 
For federal student loan borrowers, the obstacles to discharge debt in 
bankruptcy are counterbalanced by a panoply of rights. Private student loan 
borrowers have no such protections. 
  a. Federal Student Loan Repayment and Discharge Rights 
The federal student loan program has evolved to provide borrowers a broad 
set of protections designed to ensure that the loans are affordable and repayment is 
fair under the borrower’s life circumstances. We describe these rights below in four 
categories: repayment rights, disability discharge, school-related discharge, and 
public service discharge. 
Repayment rights are provided to federal student loan borrowers who can select 
among a variety of loan terms and repayment schedules, although options depend 
on the amount of the loan and the federal loan program under which the money 
 
136. Id. 
137. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3937. 
138. HOLLISTER PETRAEUS & ROHIT CHOPRA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE NEXT 
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was borrowed.140 Most importantly, federal student loan borrowers have the option 
to participate in a variety of income-driven repayment plans, depending on when 
the loan was originated or disbursed.141 For example, student borrowers in the Pay 
As You Earn (PAYE) program pay ten percent of discretionary income or less, and 
their loans are forgiven after twenty years of qualifying payments.142 Income-driven 
plans are designed for the purpose of making student loan payments affordable 
regardless of the student’s earnings after leaving school.143 
The federal student loan program offers a variety of other rights for the 
repayment of loans that are not typical of consumer credit contracts. Federal student 
loans are not declared in default until after 270 days of nonpayment.144 To forestall 
default, federal student loan borrowers can invoke rights to forbear on payment or 
defer repayment.145 Even after default, borrowers have a onetime right to 
“consolidate” loans or a right to “rehabilitate” their loan status by making nine 
months of payments in a specified amount.146 And as noted above, the cost of the 
loans also are a benefit, with interest rates much lower than private loans and 
interest accumulating only upon leaving school. 
Federal law allows discharge of federal student loan obligations for three 
categories of events: disability, school-related, and public service. Disability discharge 
is available to student loan borrowers who become totally and permanently 
disabled.147 Borrowers meeting the disability standard are subject to a review of 
 
140. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., STUDENT LOAN LAW § 3.2 (6th ed. 2019). 
141. Id. § 3.3.1. 
142. Id. The repayment history necessary to obtain forgiveness can be met under any one of 
numerous criteria. Id. § 3.3.3.8. 
143. John R. Brooks, The Case for More Debt: Expanding College Affordability by Expanding 
Income-Driven Repayment, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 847, 847 (2018) (“At its core, the promise of IDR is that 
higher education will always be affordable, no matter what a person’s income is after the person  
leaves school.”).  
144. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 6.2.1. 
145. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 4.4. Forbearance, however, has been misused 
by servicers of federal student loans as a profitable catch-all response to repayment distress even when 
students could have exercised IDR or other more appropriate repayment rights. Complaint, Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM, 2017 WL 191446 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) 
(alleging that Navient steers borrowers into forbearance instead of options in the best interests  
of borrowers). 
146. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, §§ 7.2–.3.  
147. 20 U.S.C. § 1087. The ED regulations mirror the statutory requirements, providing for 
disability discharge when the borrower “(1) Is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that—(i) Can be expected to result 
in death; (ii) Has lasted for a continuous period of not less than 60 months; or (iii) Can be expected to 
last for a continuous period of not less than 60 months; or (2) Has been determined by the Secretary 
of Veterans Affairs to be unemployable due to a service-connected disability,” and defining “substantial 
gainful activity” as “[a] level of work performed for pay or profit that involves doing significant physical 
or mental activities, or a combination of both.” 34 C.F.R. § 685.102 (2020) (applicable to direct loans). 
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income during the succeeding three years to verify continued disability.148 Federal 
student loans are discharged on death of the borrower.149 
School-related discharge is available if the school closes prior to the borrower’s 
completion of the program or if the school made a false certification to the 
appropriate higher education certification authority.150 False certification discharge 
is available under Department of Education (ED) regulations based on falsely 
certifying a non-high school graduate for a loan, forgery or identity theft, or 
certifying “the eligibility of the student who, because of a physical or mental 
condition, age, criminal record, or other reason accepted by the Secretary, would 
not meet State requirements for employment . . . in the occupation for which the 
training program supported by the loan was intended.”151 School-related discharges 
generally are not automatic but rather require an application for discharge be filed 
by the student borrower and approved by the ED.152 
Another right of federal student loan borrowers that we categorize as a form 
of school-related discharge is administrative loan cancellation by the ED due to 
school misconduct, which is commonly referred to as “borrower defense.” A 
borrower can present a defense to federal student loan repayment based on failure 
by the school to perform contractual obligations or the school engaged in a 
“substantial misrepresentation.”153 The ED promulgated a new rule related to 
borrower defense in 2016, but the Trump administration under Secretary of 
Education Betsy DeVos attempted to delay the implementation of the rule. A 
federal court vacated this action, thus leaving the rule in effect, but the end result 
has been confusion as to the use of the borrower defense rule.154  
Finally, public service discharge is available to student borrowers entering certain 
professions. The Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program, enacted in 2007, 
 
148. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.8.2 (describing three-year period and 
history of disability discharge process). 
149. 20 U.S.C. § 1087. 
150. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.3.1 (closed school discharge); id. § 10.4.1 
(false certification). Federal student loan borrowers also can discharge loans based on unpaid refunds 
by the school. Id. § 10.5.1. 
151. 34 C.F.R. § 685.215(a)(iv) (2020) (direct loans). Higher education institutions can certify a 
student’s “ability to benefit” in lieu of a high school diploma to qualify the student for federal funding. 
20 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(1)(A)(ii). Discharge is available for students who falsely certified under this 
criterion. 34 C.F.R. § 685.215(a)(1)(i)(B) (2020). Borrowers under the discontinued FFEL program had 
analogous rights. 78 Fed. Reg. 65768, 65768 (Nov. 1, 2013). 
152. If Your School Closes While You’re Enrolled or Soon After You Withdraw, You May Be 
Eligible for Discharge of Your Federal Student Loan, FED. STUDENT AID, https:// 
studentaid.gov/manage-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/closed-school [https://perma.cc/652T-
WV5B] ( last visited Sept. 27, 2020); You Might Be Eligible for a Discharge of Your Federal Student Loans 
Based on False Certification, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/forgiveness-
cancellation/false-certification [https://perma.cc/5XST-8YV6] ( last visited Sept. 27, 2020). 
153. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, §§ 10.6.1, .2.3 (describing the development and 
limits of the borrower defense rule). 
154. 34 C.F.R. § 685.222 (2020) (explaining ED regulations pertaining to direct loans disbursed 
after June 2017); Bauer v. DeVos, 332 F. Supp. 3d 181 (D.D.C. 2018); see NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., 
supra note 140, § 10. 
First to Printer_Cox, Fox & Tutt_SS Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  9:45 AM 
64 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:43 
allows student borrowers working for a public service employer and making 
income-driven repayment (IDR) payments to discharge the debt after ten years, 
rather than waiting the twenty or twenty-five years typically required for discharge 
with IDR.155 Careers eligible for PSLF discharge include those that “traditionally 
feature more modest wages, relative to many private sector fields that require 
comparable levels of advanced education,” with “nearly two thirds (62 percent) of 
borrowers who have certified intent to pursue PSLF reported earning less than 
$50,000 per year.”156 Similarly, college graduates who teach in certain low-income 
schools can receive up to $17,500 in loan forgiveness,157 and there are other targeted 
federal and state loan forgiveness programs based on service in professions with 
public benefit.158 
Disability, closed school, false certification, and PSLF discharge result in full 
debt cancellation, while a successful borrower defense application can result in a 
partial cancellation of the remaining debt.159 Federal student loan borrowers can use 
all of these repayment and discharge rights to which they are entitled; they are not 
mutually exclusive.160 It is important to note that the existence of these federal rights 
is a different matter than effective implementation of these rights. The ED and its 
contracted servicers have been severely and repeatedly criticized for failing to 
properly implement, or actively obstructing borrower use of, these rights.161 
 
155. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2020). 
156. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STAYING ON TRACK WHILE GIVING BACK: THE COST 
OF STUDENT LOAN SERVICING BREAKDOWNS FOR PEOPLE SERVING THEIR COMMUNITIES 7, 21 
(2017) [hereinafter CFPB 2017 REPORT ], https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/ 
201706_cfpb_PSLF-midyear-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2X4-T7MJ]. 
157. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.11.  
158. Id. §§ 10.12–.13; see, e.g., Richard P. Eckman, Albert H. Manwaring IV & Kelly R. Bryan, 
Heroes Act Gives Loan Relief to Reservists on Active Duty, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 205 (2004) 
(describing student loan relief available to U.S. military reservists who are called to active duty, those 
working disaster areas, and other similar groups).  
159. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.7. 
160. One potential downside of federal student loan discharge rights is that many loan 
discharges currently result in an attribution of taxable income for the cancellation of the debt. NAT’L 
CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.15.1.  
161. First, in the realm of disability discharge there are multiple examples of this failure.  
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-45, SOCIAL SECURITY OFFSETS: IMPROVEMENTS TO 
PROGRAM DESIGN COULD BETTER ASSIST OLDER STUDENT LOAN BORROWERS WITH OBTAINING 
PERMITTED RELIEF (2016); Letter from Chris Coons, Rob Portman & Angus King, U.S. Sens., to Betsy 
DeVos, Sec’y of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., David Shulkin, Sec’y of Veteran Affs., U.S. Dep’t of 
Veteran Affs. & Nancy Berryhill, Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/with-new-tax-law-in-place-sens-coons-king-portman- 
urge-trump-administration-to-discharge-outstanding-federal-student-loans-for-totally-and-permanently- 
disabled-americans [https://perma.cc/24N4-XS5D]; Clare Lombardo & Cory Turner, Student Loan 
Borrowers with Disabilities Aren’t Getting Help They Were Promised, NPR (Dec. 4, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/12/04/776058798/why-student-loan-borrowers-with-disabilities-arent-
getting-the-help-they-deserve [https://perma.cc/L5VS-XZCL]. This failure is evident in the public 
service context as well. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-547, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN 
FORGIVENESS: EDUCATION NEEDS TO PROVIDE BETTER INFORMATION FOR THE LOAN SERVICER 
AND BORROWERS (2018) (reporting only 55 of 19,321 applicants were granted a PSLF discharge of 
remaining student loan obligations because of ED administrative obstacles); U.S. GOV’T 
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  b. Private Student Loan Borrowers Lack Analogous Rights 
The borrower defense rule substantially aligns with the protections afforded 
to private student loan borrowers under the FTC Holder Rule, as discussed in Part 
II.162 Other than this exception, private student loan borrowers have no analogous 
rights under federal or state law to the plethora of repayment or discharge 
protections afforded to federal student loan borrowers.  
 
Figure 2: Lack of Protections for Private Student Loan Borrowers 
 
For the most part, private student loan lenders are bound only by general 
commercial law, including the law of contracts and tort, unfair and deceptive acts 
and practices (UDAP) law, and the like. Depending on the contract terms, lenders 
can declare private student loan borrowers in default after one missed payment or 
even impose universal default clauses that allow debt acceleration and collection 
even when the borrower is current on payments.163 The National Consumer Law 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-595, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS: IMPROVING THE 
TEMPORARY EXPANDED PROCESS COULD HELP REDUCE BORROWER CONFUSION (2019) (reporting 
that ED again rejected ninety-nine percent of PSLF applicants after Congressional temporary extension 
of program due to prior mass denials); CFPB 2017 REPORT, supra note 156, at 33 (detailing examples 
of servicing misconduct in PSLF program); Adam Minsky, What It’s like to Apply for Public Service 
Loan Forgiveness, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2019, 12:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
adamminsky/2019/08/13/what-its-like-to-apply-for-public-service-loan-forgiveness [https:// 
perma.cc/D265-BKV3] (providing an example of how the ED servicing process stymies obtaining 
PSLF discharge); Cory Turner & Chris Arnold, Dept. of Education Fail: Teachers Lose Grants, Forced to 
Repay Thousands in Loans, NPR (Mar. 28, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/ed/2018/03/28/596162853/dept-of-education-fail-teachers-lose-grants-forced-to-repay-
thousands-in-loans [https://perma.cc/9VWY-KKFS]. The failure is also present in terms of  
income-driven repayment. CFPB 2017 REPORT, supra note 156; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,  
GAO-15-663, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: EDUCATION COULD DO MORE TO HELP ENSURE 
BORROWERS ARE AWARE OF REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS OPTIONS (2015); Complaint, 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM, 2017 WL 191446  
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (alleging that Navient steers borrowers into forbearance instead of options in 
the best interests of borrowers).  
162. See infra Section II.A. 
163. But see PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 13 (suggesting 120 days is the norm for 
declaration of default on private student loans). 
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Center (NCLC) summarized the situation facing private student loan borrowers  
as follows:  
Unlike the federal student loan programs, there is no comprehensive 
federal law requiring private student lenders to offer particular types of 
relief or flexible repayment. Private student loan borrowers are generally at 
the mercy of their creditors. Unfortunately, private lenders have been 
generally inflexible in trying to assist financially distressed borrowers.164 
IDR—a critical component of the federal student loan program protections 
against borrower penury from education debt—is not a feature of the typical private 
student loan product for for-profit school students.165 Similarly, no federal or state 
law provides private student loan borrowers a right to discharge debt on total 
disability, when a school closes, or for public service. Some lenders may voluntarily 
forbear or modify debts, but these actions typically are not contractual rights of the 
private student loan debtor but rather the calculation of a creditor as to whether 
loan modification offers a better chance for the recovery of money than obtaining 
a court judgment and pursuing collection.166  
Private student loan borrowers have protections unavailable to federal student 
loan borrowers to the extent that some general laws of commerce and consumer 
lending apply to private student loans that are preempted by the Higher Education 
Act (HEA) or exclude federal student loans. For example, state usury limits can 
apply to private student loans but are preempted as to federal student loans.167 
Disclosure requirements under federal law are governed by the Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA), including special provisions for private student loans, while disclosures 
for federal student loans are stated in the HEA.168  
Substantive protections for private student loan borrowers are almost 
nonexistent under state law. Three states have enacted limited laws focusing on 
conflict of interest in private student loan origination or requiring disclosures at 
origination. A 2013 Oklahoma law prohibits using school mascots or the like in 
 
164. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 12.7.1. 
165. Some private student loans are in the form of income-share agreements. These loans have 
become newly popular as an emerging fintech product targeted at students in higher education 
programs leading to high-income occupations, but such loans are highly unlikely to be offered to  
for-profit school students. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income 
Share Agreements, 68 VAND. L. REV. 681 (2015) (describing the new wave of income share agreements 
and arguing against comprehensive regulation). 
166. A few of the larger private student loan lenders have publicly announced that they would 
consider a death or disability discharge on some loan programs, but these actions generally are limited 
to the discretion of the lender and are not widely available. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note  
140, § 12.7.4.1. 
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(d) (making state law “which limits the rate or amount of interest” 
inapplicable to federal loan that complies with rate requirements in HEA).  
168. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1638(e) (Truth in Lending Act disclosure provisions for private 
education loans), and 12 C.F.R. § 1026.46 (2020) (Regulation Z disclosure provisions for private 
education loans), with 15 U.S.C. § 1603(7) (dictating that loans under Title IV of the Higher Education 
Act do not apply to TILA). See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 2.5.1 (federal loan 
disclosures); id. § 12.4.1.1 (private loan disclosures).  
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marketing private loans and prohibits school financial aid officers from personally 
profiting from private loans.169 The State of Washington amended its higher 
education licensing law in 2018 to prohibit for-profit vocational school owners 
from profiting from private student loans, but the law narrowly applies to schools 
opening or renewing operations within the last two years and has exceptions 
allowing for such loans.170 And California higher education licensing law requires 
certain disclosures about private and federal student loans.171 The authors are 
unaware of any state law that attempts to provide any of the postorigination federal 
student loan repayment or discharge rights to private student loan borrowers that 
are available under federal law for borrowers with federal student loans.172 
2. Justifications for the Bankruptcy Discharge Exception 
Student loans generally are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. It was not always 
so. Prior to 1976, student loans were treated no differently than other types of debts 
in bankruptcy.173 Federal student loans first were subject to a waiting period before 
becoming dischargeable—of five years from 1976 to 1990, then extended to seven 
years in 1990.174 The 1998 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code eliminated the 
waiting period and instead made federal student loans of any duration dischargeable 
only if the debtor proves “undue hardship.”175 Following the imposition of this 
restriction on bankruptcy discharge, the use of bankruptcy ceased to be a widely 
available tool for distressed federal student loan borrowers.176 Even when a student 
 
169. OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 3-704 (2013). The Oklahoma law also prohibits prepayment 
penalties, but that is a right that exists in federal law for all student loans, including under TILA for 
private student loans. 15 U.S.C. § 1650(e).  
170. 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1235–36 (amending WASH. REV. CODE § 28C.10.050 (2018)).  
171. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 69800 (West 2016) (stating that higher education institutions must 
“[c]learly distinguish private loans from federal loans in individual financial aid awards”);  
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 69800.2 (West 2017) (requiring disclosures about the availability of federal  
student loans).  
172. The most substantial movement in state laws affecting private student loan borrowers is 
the growing number of states enacting licensing laws for student loan servicing of all types of student 
loans, including private student loans. See Walter Suskind, Supporting States in the Fight to Protect 
Borrowers, Blog for STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://protectborrowers.org/ 
supporting-states-in-the-fight-to-protect-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/6BZU-FPR2] (describing and 
listing states with servicing licensing laws).  
173. Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 329, 363 (2013).  
174. Between 1976 and 1990, the student debtor had to wait five years to discharge a loan in 
bankruptcy. That period was extended to seven years between 1990 and 1998. Id. at 363–64.  
175. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1837 (eliminating 
seven-year limit on requiring proof of undue hardship). 
176. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 71 (stating that student loans “are virtually 
immune from discharge in bankruptcy”). Whether undue hardship is an insurmountable mountain or a 
sometimes realistic, if inconsistently applied, alternative for some student loan debtors, is debatable. 
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment 
of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 437 (2005) (finding some relief granted in 
more than half of 286 undue hardship decisions); Aaron N. Taylor & Daniel J. Sheffner, Oh, What a 
Relief It (Sometimes) Is: An Analysis of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitions to Discharge Student Loans, 27 
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loan borrower can obtain an undue hardship discharge, it requires a level of proof, 
expense, and outcome risk that would discourage borrowers from attempting to 
obtain the discharge. 
The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) included a provision adding “any other educational loan that is a 
qualified education loan” into the same provision requiring that federal student 
loans meet the undue hardship test to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy, thus 
bringing almost all private student loans within the undue hardship exception.177 
Prior to 2005, private student loan borrowers did not face these barriers to 
discharging student loans in bankruptcy.178  
Figure 3: Bankruptcy Discharge Rights of Student Loan Debtors 
 
Professor John Pottow has analyzed bankruptcy law in multiple nations and 
identified six possible rationales for restricting student borrower access to 
bankruptcy courts: fraud, soft fraud (opportunism), internalization, shaming, public 
 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 295 (2016) (describing the undue hardship exception in bankruptcy for student 
loans and providing an empirical analysis rejecting the common perception that discharge is nearly 
impossible for student debtors). There is little doubt, however, that court decisions have discouraged 
its use. A January 15, 2020 opinion by Judge Cecelia Morris, the Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Southern District of New York, describes how bankruptcy courts have employed a “certainty 
of hopelessness” approach to meeting the undue hardship standard and how this approach has led to 
“a quasi-standard of mythic proportions so much so that most people (bankruptcy professionals as well 
as lay individuals) believe it impossible to discharge student loans.” Rosenberg v. N.Y. State Higher 
Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Rosenberg), 610 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020) (parenthetical in 
original). Judge Morris discharged Mr. Rosenberg’s debts and stated that “[t]his Court will not 
participate in perpetuating these myths” about the undue hardship standard. Id. 
177. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCP) of 2005,  
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (codified at 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)). “Qualified education loan” 
is defined by reference to section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. While not unlimited 
in scope as to private student loans, it broadly encompasses the vast majority of private student loans. 
See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, §§ 11.2.3.4, 11.2.4.  
178. Dalié Jiménez, A Tortuous History: The Student Loan Exception to Discharge (Apr. 10, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544267 
[https://perma.cc/8EWP-YSHF]. 
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fisc, and cost of capital.179 In imposing the initial waiting period restriction in 1978, 
“the articulated purpose of this legislation was to prevent a specific abuse, the filing 
of bankruptcy shortly after graduation for the primary purpose of discharging 
student loans.”180 This rationale is consistent with Pottow’s soft fraud, or 
opportunism, justification for harsher treatment of student loans in  
bankruptcy—the concern that “students rack up huge educational debts only to 
waltz into bankruptcy the day after graduation.”181  
Pottow argues that this rationale is not supportable because it makes no 
distinction between those using educational debts to become rich with the intent of 
never paying back the money and those who obtained no such benefit.182 One could 
argue that the proper response to this situation was the original legislative solution 
of a waiting period, not an undue hardship test. Writing in 2007 before the broad 
expansion of IDR, Pottow describes the best response to the soft fraud concern as 
tying bankruptcy limits to IDR: 
In contrast to the U.S. (and Canadian) mortgage-style regimes, which treat 
student debt as a lump-sum outlay that gets capitalized at graduation and 
then amortized over fixed-period installment payments, countries such as 
Australia and New Zealand (and recently, the United Kingdom) have 
embraced an income-contingent model. Repayment of student debt is a 
variable endeavor, and a repayment “tithe” is determined by a percentage 
of the debtor’s income.183 
Thus, given the broad availability of IDR for federal student loans, one could 
argue that restrictions on bankruptcy discharge are justifiable when a student 
borrower can make payments scaled to income.184 But this justification for 
imposing the undue burden obstacle has no application to private student loans. 
Private student loan borrowers have no access to IDR, with the exception of certain 
above-described income-share agreement loans.185  
 
179. John Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal Bankruptcy  
Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 245 (2007).  
180. Janice Kosol, Running the Gauntlet of “Undue Hardship”—The Discharge of Student Loans 
in Bankruptcy, 11 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 457, 460 (1981). Richard Fossey noted that this conclusion 
was reached in the absence of any supporting information, as Congress had “virtually no evidence that 
the student borrowers who had filed for bankruptcy were acting in bad faith. No data exited on the 
circumstances of the debtors who had discharged their educational loans.” Richard Fossey, The 
“Certainty of Hopelessness:” Are Courts Too Harsh Toward Bankrupt Student Loan Debtors?, 26  
J.L. & EDUC. 29, 34 (1997). In fact, a contemporaneous empirical study on the subject suggested little 
support for the argument that student borrowers abused bankruptcy. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 161 
(1977) (finding less than one percent discharge rate on student loans). 
181. Pottow, supra note 179, at 266.  
182. Id. at 266–67. 
183. Id. at 267. 
184. To be clear, we are not making the argument that the undue hardship exception is proper 
given IDR, but rather that IDR is a counterbalancing benefit that reasonably could be argued justifies 
imposing the undue burden restriction. 
185. Supra Section I.C.1.b.  
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Furthermore, reliance on IDR is particularly important and appropriate 
because the federal government does not underwrite or restrict access to federal 
student loans. Student have a right to obtain federal student loans, and the federal 
government does not engage in ex ante underwriting of the student’s likely ability 
to repay. A student with a C average in high school majoring in performance art 
with substantial credit card debt has as much right to a federal student loan as the 
high school A student in a nursing program with no other debt.  
Not so with private lenders. Borrowers do not have a right to private student 
loans and also unlike federal government student lending, private lenders regularly 
conduct an ability-to-repay analysis prior to origination. As noted previously, private 
lenders overwhelmingly require cosigners for whom the ability-to-repay analysis is 
more meaningful. Accordingly, there is no more reason to absolve private student 
loan lenders of the consequence of their underwriting failure than there would be 
for any other type of creditor.  
Nor is there any more reason to apply the cost of capital explanation to private 
student loans than other types of underwritten, unsecured debt. In any case, the 
argument for this rationale has been empirically disproven by Alexei Alexandrov 
and Dalié Jiménez, who establish that the 2005 BAPCPA change 
did not result in low credit-score students at four-year undergraduate 
institutions paying less for PSLs, despite the fact that these loans were now 
presumptively nondischargeable. Second, we find no evidence that college 
students are sensitive to price, so that even if lenders had passed on the 
savings from BAPCPA in the form of lower prices, it likely would not have 
caused an increase in the number of students who took up loans.186  
Some courts have suggested that the undue hardship test also is supported by 
the public fisc rationale—a desire to protect taxpayers. The Seventh Circuit 
articulated this position in In re Roberson as follows: “The government is not twisting 
the arms of potential students. . . . If the leveraged investment of an education does 
not generate the return the borrower anticipated, the student, not the taxpayers, 
must accept the consequences of the decision to borrow.”187 The Eleventh Circuit 
cited Roberson in similarly adopting the public fisc justification.188 
Again, this rationale has no application to private student loans, which do not 
use taxpayer money. With neither public money at issue nor a range of repayment 
and discharge options available, many of the reasons that could justify application 
 
186. Alexei Alexandrov & Dalié Jiménez, Lessons from Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student 
Loan Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 208 (2017). 
187. In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993).  
188. In re Cox, 338 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Roberson and adding that 
“Congress’s intent to make it harder for a student to shift his debt responsibility onto the taxpayer is 
clear from the 1998 amendments”).  
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of the undue hardship test have no purchase when considering private  
student loans.189  
Discerning the possible rationales actually considered by Congress when it 
swept away generally available bankruptcy protection for private student loan 
borrowers is difficult because there is essentially no legislative history for this part 
of BAPCPA. The House Committee Report on BAPCPA referred to the expansion 
of the undue hardship to private student loans only by more or less repeating the 
text of the bill.190 This absence of a legislative record is remarkable given the 
implications for the enormous private student loan market and the millions of 
private student loan borrowers. Even amongst the many dissenting opinions to the 
bill in general, no congressperson raised a concern over the changes to  
student loans.191 
Whatever the motives for the BAPCPA amendments,192 private student loan 
borrowers now face the same restrictions in bankruptcy as borrowers with federal 
student loans. Cosigners on student loans—a situation much more likely to occur 
with private student loans—likely also are subject to proof of undue hardship when 
seeking a discharge of the debt in bankruptcy.193 
Parts II and III of this Article propose solutions that provide balance to this 
stripping of bankruptcy rights from private student loan borrowers. Part II looks at 
prospective state legislation that would incorporate some of the protections given 
to federal student loan borrowers into private loans used for-profit school 
attendance. Part III looks at state legislation that would limit the use of courts to 
collect private loans from former for-profit school students.  
 
189. See also Rebekah Keller, Note, The “Undue Hardship” Test: The Dangers of a Subjective Test 
in Determining the Dischargeability of Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy, 82 MO. L. REV. 211, 235 (2017) 
(arguing that “[f]ederal student loans should remain non-dischargeable in bankruptcy because of their 
status as public debts, because they fall within the category of government resources, and because the 
U.S. Department of Education has created many alternative ways for borrowers to repay their loans,” 
but that private loans should be dischargeable).  
190. The only reference to the imposition of undue hardship exception for private student loans 
was as follows: “Sec. 220. Nondischargeability of Certain Educational Benefits and Loans. Section 220 of 
the Act amends section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that a debt for a qualified 
education loan (as defined in section 221(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code) is nondischargeable, 
unless excepting such debt from discharge would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the 
debtor’s dependents.” H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 62 (2005).  
191. Rafael I. Pardo, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 181 (2009) (noting that the undue hardship exception “did not meet with any 
objections from lawmakers, even from the House members who expressed dissenting views to 
accompany the House Judiciary Committee’s report on the 2005 amendments”); Preston Mueller, The 
Nondischargeability of Private Student Loans: A Looming Financial Crisis?, 32 EMORY  
BANKR. DEVS. J. 230, 234–35 (2015). 
192. Pardo suggests the motive for the change may be simple: “The history of the Bankruptcy 
Code’s student-loan discharge provision further bolsters the conclusion that Congress has been 
capitulating to the lender lobby.” Pardo, supra note 191, at 180. 
193. Cf. Mueller, supra note 191, at 252. 
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II. PROPOSAL ONE: PRIVATE STUDENT BORROWER PROTECTION ACT 
In this Part, we describe model state legislation to prospectively create rights 
for private student loan borrowers attending for-profit schools. The proposed 
Private Student Borrower Protection Act (PSBPA) relies on the concepts underlying 
the FTC Holder Rule, which is described in Section II.A. The following two sections 
identify the loans subject to the requirements of the law, and the protections 
available under federal student loan law that are incorporated into the PSBPA. The 
final section examines the issue of federal preemption, concluding that this type of 
state legislation is not subject to HEA preemption but may be susceptible to 
National Bank Act preemption for certain lenders. In Appendix A, we offer 
suggested language for the model legislation. 
A. The FTC Holder Rule 
The FTC Holder Rule provides a template for a consumer protection 
mechanism appropriate to the task here. Consumer protection law can roughly be 
divided into two types. First, consumer protection laws can be based on broad  
anti-fraud principles, most commonly in UDAP statutes. Second, consumer 
protection laws can incorporate rule-based protections, such as requiring market 
actors to take certain actions (e.g., make disclosures, give consumers an extended 
right to cancel, or comply with specified dispute procedures) or refrain from certain 
actions (e.g., charging interest in excess of certain limits, calling consumers on a  
do-not-call list, or threatening to sue debtors when the limitations period on the 
debt has expired).194 The typical means for imposing these requirements is a statute 
or regulation that requires or prohibits conduct in identified transactions. 
The FTC Holder Rule takes a unique approach to consumer protection that is 
appropriate to the situation that the PSBPA seeks to address. The primary 
mechanism for protection under the Holder Rule is the required incorporation of 
specific language into certain consumer finance contracts. Sellers of financed 
transactions, as defined under the rule, are required to insert a two-sentence 
provision into the consumer credit contract, which states the following in part: “Any 
holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses which 
the debtor could assert against the seller” (the Holder Rule provision).195 The 
enforcement of the protections in the Holder Rule, therefore, essentially is  
self-executing through contract law. Under the Holder Rule, the derivative liability 
of the contract holder for the conduct of the seller is written into the credit contract. 
Indeed, the derivative liability of the contract holder exists by terms of the contract 
even when the Holder Rule provision was inserted by mistake; i.e., the contract 
 
194. In other words, the well-known standards versus rule distinction applies well in the field 
of consumer protection law. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
195. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2020). 
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included the Holder Rule provision even though the Holder Rule did not apply to 
the transaction.196  
Because the Holder Rule relies on contract law for enforcement, rather than 
typical statutory enforcement mechanisms, enforcement is problematic when the 
seller or original creditor with an obligation to insert the provision fails to comply. 
Failure to include the Holder Rule provision may give rise to a UDAP or other claim 
against the seller, but that defeats the purpose of creating derivative liability for the 
creditor who is more likely to be solvent and to have an incentive to resolve the 
claim when presented as a defense to collection.197 State UDAP laws, state adoption 
of certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, or other state law can 
provide an indirect mechanism for reading the Holder Rule into the credit contract 
as an implied term in these circumstances.198 
The Holder Rule only applies when a consumer obtains financing for a 
purchase either directly from the seller199 or when the seller refers the consumer for 
financing.200 Referral includes financing through a creditor who has a business 
arrangement with the seller, which is broadly defined to include “[a]ny 
understanding, procedure, course of dealing, or arrangement, formal or informal” 
between the seller and creditor.201  
An area in which the Holder Rule provides important protection is private 
student loans for for-profit school attendance. The Holder Rule does not apply to 
public entities or nonprofits acting as the seller.202 A student attending a public 
university or nonprofit college who obtains a private student loan cannot expect to 
see the Holder Rule provision in their loan contract.203 For students using private 
loans to attend a for-profit school, however, the Holder Rule clearly applies and 
provides a means for raising the type of defense to repayment that are available to 
federal student loan borrowers under the borrower defense rule.204 This is one of 
the few consumer protections on which private student loan borrowers may rely. 
The derivative liability imposed in the Holder Rule provides recourse to 
consumers that they otherwise would not be able to obtain. It also gives creditors 
an incentive to conduct due diligence on the sellers whose purchases it finances. 
This market-supervision function is more appropriately placed on a creditor seeking 
 
196. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., FEDERAL DECEPTION LAW § 4.2.1 (3d ed. 2017). 
197. Id. § 4.4.1. 
198. Id. 
199. The Holder Rule incorporates the Truth in Lending Act definition of a “credit sale” within 
the scope of covered transactions. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(e) (2020). 
200. The Holder Rule incorporates the Truth in Lending Act definition of a “[p]urchase money 
loan” as part of defining the scope of covered transactions. Id. § 433.1(d). 
201. Id. § 433.1(g). 
202. But when a public entity or nonprofit is the creditor in a transaction in which the seller is 
covered under the Holder Rule, the credit contract may need to include the Holder Rule provision. See 
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 196, § 4.2.2.6.  
203. Id. 
204. Id.; NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.6. 
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to benefit from a regular flow of loan origination from a for-profit school than it is 
on a single student of such a school. As the FTC stated in promulgating the rule,  
Consumers are not in a position to police the market, exert leverage over 
sellers, or vindicate their legal rights in cases of clear abuse. The sheer 
expense of obtaining an accurate assessment of the likelihood of seller 
misconduct in a particular case are prohibitive. . . . [Under the Holder 
Rule], [c]reditors will simply not accept the risks generated by the truly 
unscrupulous merchant. The market will be policed in this fashion and all 
parties will benefit accordingly.205 
As described below, the Holder Rule’s unique consumer protection 
mechanism and its market regulating function are well suited to accomplish the 
purpose of the PSBPA. 
B. Loans and Borrowers Within Scope of the Act 
This Section describes the scope of the PSBPA—which loans and which 
borrowers to which it applies.206 It also fleshes out the analogy to the Holder Rule 
by comparing the scope of the regulatory schemes. 
1. Student Loans by a Nonpublic Lender for Attendance at For-Profit Schools 
The PSBPA applies to private student loans for attendance at a for-profit 
school. Each of these scope provisions is discussed below. 
The guiding concept of the Act is to provide the rights of federal student loan 
borrowers to private student loan borrowers in order to counterbalance the undue 
hardship obstacle to bankruptcy protection. The Act, therefore, incorporates the 
definition of “qualified education loans” used in the Bankruptcy Code to include 
private student loans within the undue hardship exception, which is a term 
incorporated by reference from the Internal Revenue Code.207 The Act then 
expressly excludes government student loans—again using the Bankruptcy Code 
definition—because “qualified education loans” could otherwise encompass such 
loans.208 In addition to excluding federal student loans, this provision also would 
mean that loans by state government entities would not be covered by PSBPA 
 
205. Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Preservation of 
Consumer Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53523 (Nov. 18, 1975). 
206. The PSBPA scope provisions incorporate by reference terms of federal law in numerous 
instances. Each state considering adoption of the PSBPA should evaluate the particular meaning of 
such an incorporation by reference under that state’s law. See generally F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass  
Law: Legislation by Reference in the States, 68 LA. L. REV. 1201 (2008) (tracing the development of the 
statutory-incorporation-by-reference doctrine, the types of statutory references, courts’ expansionist 
interpretation of the doctrine, and the interaction between the doctrine and the  
non-delegation doctrine). 
207. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d) (incorporated by reference in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B)). 
208. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B).  
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protections.209 If an arguably private student loan is not defined as such under these 
terms, it should also not be subject to the bankruptcy undue hardship exception, 
and thus there is not the need for a ballast of compensating borrower protections.210 
The PSBPA does not exclude from its scope all nonprofit lenders: a group of 
lenders covered by the undue hardship exception language.211 Including nonprofit 
lenders is consistent with providing protections to student borrowers who lack 
ready access to bankruptcy discharge and lack access to federal student loan 
protections.212 An exception to this inclusion of nonprofit lenders is that the 
PSBPA excludes from its scope nonprofit lenders with government affiliation, for 
the same reasons that loans by state entities are excluded.213 
The Act incorporates the HEA definition of for-profit schools, deemed 
“proprietary institutions of higher education” in the HEA.214 This definition 
expressly excludes public and nonprofit institutions.215 The Act focuses on private 
loans to for-profit school students because the nexus of private loans and for-profit 
schools has been an area of repeated abuse. The problems with for-profit schools, 
including the targeting of veterans and minorities, has ebbed and flowed for 
decades, at least since World War II.216 Protecting for-profit students from abusive 
private loans is a long-term problem that has needed, and likely will continue to 
need, a long-term public policy solution.  
 
209. Some state governments operate loan programs. See, e.g., About SELF Loans,  
MINN. OFF. HIGHER EDUC., http://www.selfloan.state.mn.us/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/VC2A-
TLVS] ( last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (describing the SELF loan programs as “a long-term, low-interest 
student loan . . . administered by the Minnesota Office of Higher Education, a state agency” and stating 
that “the interest rates may be lower than private loans and some federal loans”); Andrew Wold,  
Alt-Remedies to Paying Student Loans: In Some Cases, Relief Is Available, 76 BENCH & BAR MINN. 27, 
29 (2019) (describing SELF program). 
210. For a discussion of the narrow universe of loans that may not be covered by the undue 
hardship exception, see NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, §§ 11.2.3.1, .3. 
211. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(i). 
212. Including nonprofit lenders also would help prevent the covert use of a nonprofit by a 
for-profit institution. See infra notes 215–17 and accompanying text. One could imagine a for-profit 
institution establishing a nonprofit lender to make loans to attend a for-profit school and thus claiming 
these loans were excluded from coverage by the PSBPA. The Act also does not exclude the reference 
to “an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend” in 11  
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). This odd category of repayment obligations would fall within the scope of the 
PSBPA, but only if the other scope provisions apply. 
213. The 2019 GAO Report described this group of lenders as follows: “Nonbank state lenders 
provide private student loans to residents of their states and out-of-state students attending in-state 
schools. These lenders are mission-driven entities focused on increasing college access and affordability 
in their states, among other things, and are funded through tax-advantaged bond funding.”  
GAO-19-430, supra note 16, at 3 n.7. 
214. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b). For a history of the derivation of this term under the HEA, see Ass’n 
of Proprietary Colls. v. Duncan, 107 F. Supp. 3d 332, 341–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
215. A “proprietary” institution is one that “does not meet the requirement of paragraph (4) of 
section 1001(a) of this title,” 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1)(C), which “is a public or other nonprofit 
institution,” 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(4). 
216. Supra Section I.B. 
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Nonprofit schools are excluded along with public institutions in the proposed 
scope provisions of the PSBPA. A concern with this exclusion is that there is a 
growing problem of for-profits covertly using nonprofits to circumvent consumer 
protections. For-profit school owners establish a nonprofit that they control, 
effectively negating the nonprofit purpose. Lack of effective Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) control makes the problem difficult to remedy.217 As Robert Shireman 
has noted, “of all schools claiming nonprofit status for at least five years, the three 
with the most fraud complaints [by student borrowers] are covert  
for-profits—conversions in which power never actual shifted away from owners 
who have an ongoing financial interest.”218  
Accordingly, the PSBPA includes a provision including within the scope of 
the Act a nonprofit substantially operated or controlled by a for-profit institution. 
Ultimately, the problem of covert nonprofits is an enforcement issue for the IRS 
and state authorities. A law enacted in Maryland in 2019 and legislation pending in 
California provide models for increased enforcement to address this problem.219 
2. In-State Students of Online Schools Covered 
States clearly have an interest in protecting students when loans are originated 
for physical attendance at a school located in the state. Yet a focus on for-profit 
schools also necessitates attention to the online learning space. The PSBPA covers 
students attending schools with a physical presence in the state and students who 
reside in the state while obtaining a private loan to attend an online school without 
a physical presence in the state. 
The number of students completing online-only education has increased over 
time, unsurprisingly. The percentage of total undergraduate enrollment with classes 
solely through online learning rose from 3.8% in 2007–2008 to 6.5% in 2011–2012 
to 10.8% in 2015–2016.220 For-profit schools are disproportionately enrolling these 
students, especially out-of-state online students. As shown in Table 1, for-profit 
schools enrolled only about 5.5% (1.09 million) of the total higher education 
 
217. Robert Shireman, These Colleges Say They’re Nonprofit—But Are They?, CENTURY 
FOUND. (Aug. 24, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/colleges-say-theyre-nonprofit 
[https://perma.cc/5Z28-8J8U]; Brian Galle, Conversions of For-Profit to Nonprofit Colleges Deserve 
Regulators’ Scrutiny,  MEDIUM  (Apr. 3, 2018),  https://medium.com/whatever-source-
derived/conversions-of-for-profit-to-nonprofit-colleges-deserve-regulators-scrutiny-1b9174cf534d 
[https://perma.cc/TND7-PCUC]; see also Marguerite Mills, Privatization of Public Education: Balancing 
Students and the Bottom Line, 6 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 1091 (2019), 
https://law.emory.edu/ecgar/perspectives/volume-6/perspectives/privatization-public-education-
students-bottom-line.html [https://perma.cc/M8SP-SGHR] (describing the case of Purdue Global). 
218. Shireman, supra note 217. 
219. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 10-101 (West 2019); Assemb. B. 1341, 2019–2020 Leg.,  
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id= 
201920200AB1341 [https://perma.cc/D6NW-S5FD]. 
220. Digest of Education Statistics: Table 311.22, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_311.22.asp [https://perma.cc/N2JU-3RYV] 
( last visited Sept. 27, 2020). 
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enrollment of 19.76 million students in 2017, but they enrolled about 21% (.657 
million) of the 3.1 million online-only students.221 Approximately sixty percent of 
for-profit school students are online-only, or more than three times the percentage 
of online-only students compared to private nonprofit institutions and more than 
five times the percentage of online-only students compared to public institutions.222 
These for-profit online students draw from a broad geographic area. While 
approximately eighty-four percent of online-only students at public institutions 
were in-student residents, only approximately sixteen percent of for-profit  









Public 14,560,155 1,657,185 11.4% 
  Private Nonprofit 4,106,477 788,407 19.2% 
  Private For-Profit 1,098,966 657,908 59.9% 
Table 1: Online-Only Enrollment by Type of Institution, 2017224 
 
Schools that are predominantly online-only—meaning more than ninety 
percent of their students are exclusively online—are dominated by for-profit 
institutions.225 Of the 103 higher education institutions that fit this definition, 
approximately sixty-five percent are for-profit.226  
Regulation of online higher education is a bit of a mess. A key difficulty in this 
area has been determining how authorization of a higher education institution 
should occur when the program offered is online. States are an integral part of the 
authorization system, but the ED also has a critical role, including determining 
which online students are eligible for federal student loans based on the various 
state authorizations.227 The vast majority of states, with the notable exception of 
 
221. Digest of Educational Statistics: Table 311.15, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_311.15.asp [https://perma.cc/8JBW-ZTU4] 




225. Digest of Educational Statistics: Table 311.33, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. n.1, 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_311.33.asp [https://perma.cc/Y75N-TVAJ] 
( last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (Fall 2017 enrollment).  
226. Id. at tbl.311.33.  
227. Lindsay McKenzie, Rethinking State Authorization, Again, INSIDE HIGHER ED ( Jan. 23, 
2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2019/01/23/education-department-
revisits-state-authorization-online [https://perma.cc/ERX4-39P7] (“After almost 10 years of 
discussion, one thing is clear: state authorization is complex. Few groups agree on exactly how it should 
be done, or even if it should be done at all. Yet Education Department officials are optimistic they can 
find a way forward that will make the rules simpler for colleges. The test will be whether they can do 
so without significantly reducing consumer protections for students.”). The HEA includes the notion 
of online learning in the term “distance education,” 20 U.S.C. § 1003(7), but the relevant provisions of 
the HEA do not substantially address how to resolve state authorization concerns.  
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California, have entered into some form of the State Authorization Reciprocity 
Agreement (SARA), an interstate compact designed to bring continuity to state 
authorization of online schools.228 The Act incorporates the terminology of SARA 
for “physical presence” and “distance education” to effectuate the goal of covering 
students who either attend an in-state school or have a primary residence in the state 
while attending an online school that does not have a physical presence in  
the state.229 
3. The Usefulness of the Holder Rule Analogy 
The concept underlying the Holder Rule—that consumer protections are 
written into consumer contracts—provides a useful tool for the purpose of the 
PSBPA. Most consumer finance protections work by regulating contract formation 
or terms of credit that are apparent at the time of origination,230 such as disclosures 
or representations made prior to the execution of the contract,231 substantive terms 
that are fixed at the time of origination,232 or rights to cancel that arise within days 
of the loan origination.233 The rights of the borrower in these situations can be 
determined at or near the time of origination. Accordingly, when borrowers move 
to other states after loan origination, the time for effect of the state law protections 
has already occurred and an issue of whether the law in the originating state applies 
to the loan does not arise, absent preemption by federal law.234  
The protections in the PSBPA, however, often depend on conditions that arise 
subsequent to the origination of the student loan, such as disability discharge or the 
amount of repayment under IDR, that may occur at a time when the student 
borrower lives in another state. Following the logic of the Holder Rule, these 
protections would be in the contract terms and thus follow the borrowers to any 
other state. This is a particularly useful feature given that students often are mobile 
both while they are attending higher education institutions and after they 
graduate.235 Absent use of the Holder Rule concept, questions might also arise as to 
 
228. NC-SARA Institution Directory, NC-SARA, https://www.nc-sara.org/directory 
[https://perma.cc/U9Q9-Y48A] ( last visited Sept. 27, 2020). 
229. NAT’L COUNCIL FOR STATE AUTHORIZATION RECIPROCITY AGREEMENTS, SARA 
MANUAL 40–42 (version 20.1 2020). 
230. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020) (stating that courts may 
refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts).  
231. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (discussing 
what misrepresentations make a contract voidable); supra text accompanying notes 168, 169, 171. 
232. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (setting usury limits for certain loans).  
233. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (setting out a three-day cancellation period for home equity 
loans or lines of credit). 
234. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine 
and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 521 (2004) (describing the use of 
the “exportation doctrine” to preempt state regulation of consumer finance contracts initiated by a 
national bank). 
235. DOUG SHAPIRO, AFET DUNDAR, FAYE HUIE, PHOEBE KHASIALA WAKHUNGU, 
AYESHA BHIMDIWALA, ANGEL NATHAN & YOUNGSIK HWANG, NAT’L STUDENT CLEARINGHOUSE 
RSCH. CTR., SIGNATURE REP. 15: TRANSFER AND MOBILITY: A NATIONAL VIEW OF STUDENT 
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whether a borrower with private student loans from a for-profit school who moves 
after graduation from a state with no PSBPA to a state with PSBPA protections 
would be afforded those protections. Under the PSBPA use of the Holder Rule, 
lenders would not have been obligated to insert protections into the loan contracts 
and such borrowers would not be covered under the protections of the Act. 
The market-regulating function of the Holder Rule also is helpful in the 
context of borrowing by for-profit school students. When lenders have to accept 
certain risks attributable to the conduct and usefulness of the for-profit school’s 
educational program, underwriting will mean evaluating each for-profit school to 
determine the likelihood that it will close or other school-related discharge rights, 
and the likelihood that the school’s graduate will earn enough to pay back the loan 
under an IDR formula. 
One limitation of the Holder Rule is that it lacks an explicit enforcement 
mechanism when sellers and lenders within the scope of the rule fail to include the 
required provision in the consumer contract.236 This is a particular problem for the 
Holder Rule because the FTC Act lacks a private right of action. The PSBPA 
resolves this problem by including a provision that any contract within the scope of 
the Act that fails to include the required contract terms shall be deemed to have 
incorporated those terms in the contract and the lender shall be deemed to have 
violated the state UDAP law, thus providing for a fee-shifting private right of action 
in almost every state.237  
C. Federal Student Loan Protections Incorporated in the PSBPA  
We earlier identified four categories of protections afforded to federal student 
loan borrowers—repayment rights, disability discharge, school-related discharge, 
and public service discharge.238 The purpose of the PSBPA is to balance the 
existence of obstacles to bankruptcy with state law protections analogous to the 
protections afforded to federal student loan borrowers. In this Section, we identify 
which of the federal student loan protections achieve this objective while not unduly 
impeding the access to private student loans for for-profit students. We also note 
which of the protections can be managed with due diligence on the part of the 
lender and thus are consistent with the market-regulating function of the Holder 
 
MOVEMENT IN POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, FALL 2011 COHORT 20–21 (2018) (“Nearly half of 
students who started at four-year private nonprofit institutions and for-profit institutions transferred 
out-of-state . . . .”); NAT’L STUDENT CLEARINGHOUSE RSCH. CTR., SNAPSHOT REPORT: INTERSTATE 
MOBILITY (2012), https://nscresearchcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/SnapshotReport5-
InterstateMobility.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G9C-QXQC] (“On average, 15.1 percent of all  
U.S. postsecondary students who received undergraduate degrees in 2010–11 had previously attended 
college in at least one other state or territory.”). 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 197–198. 
237. Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical Analysis of 
Attorney’s Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 518–24 app. (2008) 
(providing a list of state fee-shifting provisions with private UDAP enforcement). 
238. Supra Section I.C.1.a. 
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Rule. The PSBPA adopts a form of IDR tied to federal IDR payments and 
incorporates federal disability and school-related discharge protections but does not 
require private loans to offer public service discharge. 
1. IDR Rights 
The most important of the safeguards afforded to federal student loan 
borrowers are repayment rights, and the most important repayment right across the 
totality of borrower circumstances is IDR. As noted by Professor Pottow, IDR that 
allows calibration of repayment to income is the only reasonable justification of a 
bankruptcy discharge exception for student loans.239 The PSBPA incorporates IDR 
by linking private loan repayment to federal student loan repayment when all of a 
borrower’s federal student loan repayments are made through IDR, as follows: 
* Private loan monthly repayment amounts are limited to thirty percent of the 
federal loan IDR payment made by the borrower who attended the higher education 
institution, without regard to income of coborrowers. The thirty percent amount is 
calculated without regard to prepayment of the federal loans to obviate the risk to 
the lender of the student borrower prepaying only the federal student loan for 
purposes of effectively discharging the private student loan. 
* The private lender with the oldest originated loan obtains the full benefit of 
the limited IDR payment, with any remaining eligible payment allocated to private 
lenders in order of loan origination.  
* Once the borrower has made all required federal IDR payments for the full 
number of years, typically twenty years, no future payments would be due on the 
private loan and the loan would be considered fully repaid.  
* If the borrower did not obtain any federal student loans for attendance at 
the school receiving the benefits of the loan proceeds, then the lender would be 
required to offer any borrower in default the option of a loan modification limiting 
future payments to the same terms as the PAYE IDR program. 
* If the student borrower elects not to repay federal loans through IDR, then 
the private loan payments would not be eligible for IDR, which is consistent with 
the purpose of the PSBPA to incorporate federal student loan protections. 
This approach allows a simple benchmark method of determining IDR 
payments. Creating parallel outcomes for the federal and private student loans 
makes sense because the rationale for incorporating these rights in state law is to 
provide private student loan borrowers some of the protections available to federal 
student loan borrowers. Parallel determination of loan payment amounts also 
should be relatively efficient for lenders, as there are a limited number of loan 
servicers for student loans, and thus the loan servicer is likely to understand the 
requirement of federal student loan repayment and discharge rights.240  
 
239. Pottow, supra note 179, at 266–67. 
240. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 5.2.1.1.  
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The PSBPA allocates access to these thirty percent payments by date of 
origination of the private loan. Unlike federal loans, which are all made directly by 
the federal government after 2011, there can be multiple private student loan 
creditors. This can be true even when the loans were originated by the same entity 
because the loans can be sold in the secondary market. When more than one private 
student loan is securitized, it is almost certain that the borrower’s loans will be 
owned by multiple entities, typically a trust.241  
The PSBPA, therefore, states that the percentage limit tied to federal IDR 
payments is the total for all private student loans owed by that borrower and access 
to this thirty percent repayment amount is allocated by date of origination. This 
gives private lenders an incentive to maintain a higher relative balance of federal to 
private student loans and cease lending when the private share of IDR payments 
will go to prior in time loans and lenders. It also provides an incentive to for-profit 
schools to direct students to federal loan programs when possible. This directly 
targets one of the abuses of for-profit school students, which is the use of high-cost 
student loans when federal student loans are available.242  
2. Discharge Rights 
School-related discharges offer the clearest case for inclusion in the PSBPA. 
Allowing such discharge promotes exactly the sort of lender due diligence 
supporting the reason for the Holder Rule because the lender is in the best position 
to more efficiently determine whether a school engages in practices that would 
expose it to such risks. It also is consistent with fairly balancing the lack of 
bankruptcy discharge rights if the expected benefits of the loan are not realized 
because of school misconduct. For example, the right to discharge a federal student 
loan when a school falsely certifies that its program meets relevant state 
requirements for employment in the field of training is an archetype of the kind of 
problems encountered by for-profit school students.243 Private student loan 
discharge should follow from federal student loan discharge.  
The disability discharge protections available to federal student borrowers also 
meet the purposes of the PSBPA. A person with a total and permanent disability 
and resulting lack of income would typically be eligible for a simple bankruptcy 
discharge of a private student loan absent the undue hardship provision. Requiring 
this protection through state law directly compensates for the loss of  
bankruptcy rights. 
The public service discharge, however, is not a right incorporated into the 
PSBPA. These programs use loan forgiveness by the federal government to 
incentivize and reward public service. This laudable goal reduces the burden of loan 
 
241. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 133, at 13–15 (describing analogous mortgage servicing 
process resulting in ownership of a loan by a trust or other single-purpose vehicle).  
242. Supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
243. See, e.g., Vasquez, supra note 100.  
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repayment primarily for a reason unrelated to making federal student loan 
repayment proportionate to ability to repay. Nor is this type of discharge consistent 
with the Holder Rule function of shifting due diligence to the lender.  
Similar to IDR rights, the PSBPA uses the exercise of the federal right to loan 
discharge as a proxy for the availability of the right as to the private student loan if 
the PSBPA incorporates that right. If the federal student loan has been discharged, 
the private student loan is similarly discharged if that federal discharge right is 
incorporated in the contract through the PSBPA.244 If the federal student loan is in 
forbearance or deferment pending a decision on the availability of the discharge, 
then the same status applies to the private student loan if the borrower’s application 
was made in good faith. Similarly, if the federal right requires a substantive 
determination, the PSBPA states that a determination by the ED shall control as to 
any right conferred under the contract provisions required to be included by  
the PSBPA. 
D. Preemption  
States can legislate the terms and conditions of private student loans without 
concern for preemption under the HEA.245 Loans made by a national bank, 
however, raise preemption concerns under the National Bank Act (NBA).  
The Dodd-Frank Act changed the terms of NBA preemption by explicitly 
adopting the Barnett Bank decision to determine when a “[s]tate consumer financial 
law prevents or significantly interferes with” the activities of a national bank.246 An 
examination of NBA preemption is beyond the scope of this Article, but it seems 
possible that national bank lenders would not have to comply with the terms of the 
PSBPA. A state considering adopting the PSBPA should consider adding a 
provision exempting compliance for loans originated by a national bank.  
Even if national banks are free to ignore the requirements of the PSBPA under 
NBA preemption, the PSBPA would provide a powerful tool to provide some 
protections to this forgotten segment of for-profit school students with private 
loans. First, while private student loans mostly are made by national banks, that is 
not the case with private loans to for-profit school students. The financial crisis 
curtailed private student lending, but bank funding of for-profit schools was 
particularly impacted. As the CFPB reported in its 2012 study of private school 
loans, “[w]hen bank-funded private student loans became unavailable to students at 
 
244. If there is a partial discharge on federal loan for a borrower defense, then a proportionate 
percentage should be given for the private loan. 
245. State law authority over private student loans applies even when the same laws might be 
preempted in some cases as to federal student loans. See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140,  
§ 14.2.4.2 (observing that HEA “preemption of state debt collection claims is not an issue for private 
student loans, but it may be for federal student loans.”); id. § 14.3.4 (“Suits against servicers of private 
student loans cannot claim HEA preemption, even if the same servicer services federal student loans.”); 
id. § 14.5.2.4.5 (“Private student loans are not regulated by the HEA so there is no HEA preemption 
of state law claims against private student loan lenders.”) 
246. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B). 
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for-profit schools, some proprietary programs began lending directly to their 
students in response.”247 NBA preemption would not be relevant to proprietary 
school self-funding or other non-bank funding methods.  
Second, there are limits to the reach of national bank lending here. Not all 
loans that are nominally made by a national bank fall under NBA preemption. In 
particular, “rent-a-bank” arrangements have been found to invalidate application of 
NBA preemption.248 This type of scheme has occurred with private student loans. 
Navient, for example, was alleged to have used Stillwater National Bank as a front 
for their loans, and thus NBA preemption might not have applied to such loans.249 
Third, even if the impact of the PSBPA is to shift more private for-profit 
school lending to national banks, such a move would at least bring a percentage of 
private lending from the shadow banking sector into the bank supervision system. 
To the extent that certain for-profit school practices can be exposed as unfair or 
deceptive, and thus introducing risk, federal banking regulators could be pressured 
to place general limits on the associated lending practices, as occurred following the 
financial crisis.250  
III. PROPOSAL TWO: PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN MEDIATION ACT 
Our second proposal, the Private Student Loan Mediation Act (PSLMA) 
would provide resources to the growing number of private student loan borrowers 
currently in default. This model state legislation would require mediation on 
defaulted private student loans before initiating legal proceedings. This concept is 
modeled after the mandatory mediation programs that were implemented in 
response to the foreclosure crisis. The following sections look at the recommended 
features of a private student loan mediation program. In Appendix B, we provide 
suggested language for the model legislation. 
A. Usefulness of the Foreclosure Mediation Analogy 
There are many parallels to mortgage servicing problems experienced by 
homeowners leading up to and during the financial crisis and the looming student 
loan debt crisis. During the financial crisis, millions of American families faced 
 
247. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 33. 
248. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87  
MINN. L. REV. 1, 105–06 (2002) (describing the rent-a-bank scheme with payday lending); Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV157522JFW(RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 
2016) (rejecting NBA preemption in rent-a-bank circumstance). 
249. Ubaldi v. SLM Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
250. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3.2 (2020) (setting out the definitions of the risk-based capital 
frameworks from Basel III). Perhaps for-profit schools that have been exposed for unfair and deceptive 
practices could incur a higher risk-weight in the risk-based capital framework, which might force banks 
to hold less of these loans and could encourage banks to monitor for-profit schools. See generally 
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 215–32 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 5th ed. 2013) (describing the application of the risk-based 
capital framework from Basel III).  
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foreclosure. In a comment to the CFPB, the Connecticut Department of Banking 
noted the parallels between problems with student loans and government response 
during the mortgage crisis—“this is not déjà vu. We have been here before.”251 As 
such, “senior government officials, federal regulators, state law enforcement 
agencies, consumer advocates, and others have suggested that the steps taken by 
policymakers to strengthen servicing protections for homeowners may offer an 
instructive analogy for policymakers and market participants with regard to the 
student loan servicing market.”252  
One of the most effective of measures to address the mortgage crisis was the 
use of mandatory preforeclosure mediation. An analysis of the state and local 
negotiated foreclosure alternatives adopted between 2008 and 2014 “uniformly 
supports the effectiveness of foreclosure mediation in achieving loan modifications 
and other resolutions that avoid the need for foreclosure sales.”253 Mediation could 
be effective with private student loan default because it addresses the failures of 
servicers to effectively inform borrowers of repayment options and because it 
changes the dynamics of debt negotiation. 
Private student loan borrowers often cannot access existing repayment 
options that private lenders may be willing to offer the borrower. As extensively 
described above, private student loans do not offer the same repayment plan and 
discharge options as federal student loan borrowers. Nonetheless, “a number of 
large private student lenders have developed alternative repayment options that take 
into account borrowers’ financial circumstances.”254 In fact, the five banks with the 
 
251. Request for Information on Student Loan Servicing, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=DESC&sb=postedDate&po=0&s=CFPB
-2015-0021-0381&dct=PS&D=CFPB-2015-0021 [https://perma.cc/8UG4-JCB2] ( last visited  
Sept. 27, 2020).  
252. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC 
INPUT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 13 (2015) [hereinafter STUDENT LOAN SERVICING], 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_student-loan-servicing-report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/V9VU-C4SA] (citing Press Release, Ted Mitchell, Under Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Remarks 
at the Federal Student Aid (FSA) Servicing Summit in Atlanta, GA (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/prepared-remarks-us-under-secretary-education-ted-mitchell-
federal-student-aid-fsa-servicing-summit-atlanta-ga [https://perma.cc/Q33J-L8KD]); Press Release, 
Sarah Bloom Raskin, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks on Student Loans at the 
National Consumer Law Center’s Annual Consumer Rights Litigation Conference (Nov. 6, 2014), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/JL2689.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZY9V-
EC7N]; The U.S. Economic and Fiscal Outlook: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 113th  
Cong. (2014) (testimony of Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), 
https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings-calendar?ID=4394DB09-A2E8-4098-95EF-
39F0B7E8C75B [https://perma.cc/RN9K-TXM3]; Letter from Lisa Madigan, Att’y Gen., Ill. Off. of 
the Att’y Gen., to Arne Duncan, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. ( June 1, 2015), 
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2015_06/ArneDuncanLetter.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Q7DJ-NK4P].  
253. Alan M. White, Foreclosure Mediation: An Experiment that Worked 7 ( Jan. 29, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2724732 [https://perma.cc/ZC48-C6GT].  
254. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 252, at 21; see also, Letter from Navient, to Monica 
Jackson, Off. of the Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau ( July 13, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2015-0021-0355 [https://perma.cc/JG6E-
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largest private student loan portfolios offer alternative payment programs.255 Yet 
many borrowers have no idea these options are available to them because the 
process for applying for these options are unclear and the eligibility criteria is not 
publicly available.256 And the National Consumer Law Center concludes that 
“[p]rivate loan lenders and loan holders rarely offer reasonable settlements.”257 
Which is, in part, because none of the five banks with the largest private student 
loan portfolios offer alternative payment programs after default believing them to 
be unnecessary because of the availability of alternative payment before default.258  
As with the mortgage crisis, loan servicers are an obstacle to mutually 
beneficial loan modifications. Borrowers are often unable to obtain even basic 
information about alternative repayment plans.259 Often this information is not 
advertised on servicers’ websites or “included in [the] borrowers’ promissory notes 
or loan contracts.”260 Borrowers express frustration about the process for obtaining 
a decision, including customer service representatives being “unable to identify 
appropriate personnel who can make a determination about repayment options” 
and refusing to provide information about why a repayment plan option was 
denied.261 Even though federal agencies and financial institutions deployed 
mortgage loss mitigation initiatives designed to help borrowers avoid foreclosure, 
the mortgage servicing practices significantly hindered the efficacy of  
these measures.262  
We know from the recent foreclosure crisis that servicer incentives do not 
align with either the loan investors’ needs and interests or the borrowers’ needs and 
 
WNZC]; Letter from James L. Preston, Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, to Monica Jackson,  
Off. of the Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau ( July 9, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2015-0021-0974 [https://perma.cc/XJM4-
SXRK]. As the Bureau has noted in other publications, there remain questions about the scale of these 
programs. For further discussion of alternative repayment programs and private student loans, see 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN  
18–32 (2015). See also Kevin Wack, Wells Fargo, Discover to Start Modifications of Student Loans,  
AM. BANKER (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:15 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/wells-fargo-
discover-to-start-modifications-of-student-loans [https://perma.cc/7YNT-TXW2]. 
255. GAO-19-430, supra note 16, at 11.  
256. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 252, at 25–31. 
257. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 12.7.3 
258. The reasons given for not offering rehabilitation programs include low delinquency and 
default rates, availability of pre-default payment programs, operational uncertainties, reduced borrower 
incentives to avoid default, and risk of compliance violations. GAO-19-430, supra note 16, at 11–12.  
259. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 252, at 25 (“Comments from individual student 
loan borrowers and organizations representing public service workers note that servicers of both private 
and federal student loans may not inform borrowers experiencing financial hardship about available 
alternative repayment plans.”).  
260. Id. at 27. 
261. Id. at 70. 
262. Id. at 12; Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Thomas J. Miller,  
Iowa Att’y Gen.). 
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interests.263 We also learned from the foreclosure crisis that mediation can help both 
borrowers and lenders resolve this problem.  
An analysis by Alan M. White of the empirical research and data measuring 
the effectiveness of foreclosure mediation found that mediation significantly 
increases the likelihood of better outcomes.264 Mediation can also increase 
participation rates and rates of successful negotiations.265 The better outcomes are 
not limited to just within the mediation itself but can have a lasting effect on 
subsequent redefault rates.266 
Some of the success from mediation may be the result of simply monitoring 
the loan servicing industry. A study by J. Michael Collins and Carly Urban looked 
at the impact of Maryland’s emergency servicer reporting requirement (ESRR) 
policy which was implemented before federal loss mitigation programs, such as the 
federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), were launched.267 The 
ESSR policy simply required mortgage servicers to report on the effort to help 
homeowners facing foreclosure without any requirement to offer a specific loss 
mitigation option or sanctions from noncompliance.268 Prior to the implementation 
of the ESRR, mortgage loan servicers, much like student loan servicers, adopted a 
“do nothing” strategy while “facing opaque information about a borrower” which 
creates a “status quo bias.”269 The study found that “[s]upervision changes this 
dynamic, making modifications and foreclosures the primary alternatives and 
leaving doing nothing as an inferior option.”270 
B. Utilization of Student Loan Mediation by Bankruptcy Courts 
Two bankruptcy court districts, Middle District of Florida and Southern 
District of New York, have already implemented mediation programs to help deal 
with the mounting student debt crisis.271 The programs’ designs are based upon 
 
263. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 133.  
264. Alan M. White, Foreclosure Diversion and Mediation in the States, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 
450 (2017). 
265. Id. at 420 n.59. 
266. Id. at 423. This conclusion is based upon a study by J. Michael Collins and Carly Urban of 
three Florida judicial districts. See J. Michael Collins & Carly Urban, Mandatory Mediation and the 
Renegotiation of Mortgage Contracts, 125 ECON. J. 1734, 1739–40 (2015). 
267. J. Michael Collins & Carly Urban, The Dark Side of Sunshine: Regulatory Oversight and 
Status Quo Bias, 107 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 470 (2014).  
268. 35 Md. Reg. 1183 ( June 20, 2008). 
269. Collins & Urban, supra note 267, at 473; see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch  
& Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5  
J. ECON. PERSPS. 193 (1991); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
270. Collins & Urban, supra note 267, at 473.  
271. The Student Loan Management Program for the Middle District of Florida became 
effective in October 1, 2019. See Third Amended Administrative Order Prescribing Procedures for 
Student Loan Management Program (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2019) (Administrative Order  
FLMB-2019-5). The Student Loan Mediation Program for the Southern District of New York became 
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mortgage mediation programs utilized by the same courts during the foreclosure 
crisis which have had great success in reducing litigation.272 The judiciary’s goals in 
creating such a program are to “facilitate communication and the exchange of 
information in an efficient and transparent manner, and to encourage the parties to 
consensually reach a feasible and jointly beneficial agreement under the 
administrative oversight” of the bankruptcy court.273 
Both programs apply to government and private student loans no matter what 
type of institution the student attended. Though neither program requires a lender 
to add or modify existing repayment options, good faith participation is required.274 
Each program also requires an open and transparent exchange of information with 
set time frames including a time and process for requesting to participate in the 
program.275 The Southern District of New York requires that the debtor first apply 
for a student loan repayment option directly with the creditor, and only if there is 
no response within forty-five days of mailing the application or if the response 
received was inconsistent with the results provided by the application can the debtor 
be eligible for the program.276  
Neither program has been in operation long enough to produce data on their 
efficacy, but their adoption shows judicial support for mediation and the usefulness 
of the foreclosure mediation analogy.  
C. Private Student Loans Mediation Act Features 
1. Loans Subject to the Act 
Much like the PSBPA, the goal of PSLMA is to apply to all private loans that 
are provided by for-profit higher education institutions. But the Act would also 
 
effective in January 27, 2020. See Adoption of Student Loan Mediation Before Litigation Program 
Procedures (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2020) (General Order M-536). 
272. See Tammy Branson & Christie D. Arkovich, Student Loan Management Program in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, 88 BRIEFS 8 ( Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://www.orangecountybar.org/news/student-loan-management-program-in-the-united-states-
bankruptcy-court-for-the-middle-district-of-florida/ [https://perma.cc/NLN3-ZV6V]. Tammy 
Branson and Christine Arkovich are members of the Student Loan Committee for the U.S. Middle 
District of Florida. Id. 
273. Third Amended Administrative Order Prescribing Procedures for Student Loan 
Management Program, supra note 271, ¶ 1. 
274. Id. ¶ 7(a) (defining good faith as “The Required Parties shall act in good faith throughout 
the SLM Period. Good faith includes, but is not limited to, promptly responding to all inquiries through 
the Portal and providing all requested documentation and information.”); Adoption of Student Loan 
Mediation Before Litigation Program Procedures, supra note 271, ¶ VII (defining good faith, which is 
required when SLM parties negotiate, as “includ[ing] a duty by the Creditor to accept a Debtor’s 
postpetition Student Loan payments as provided by the SLM Program and Local Rule 9019-3. A Party 
that fails to participate in SLM in good faith may be subject to sanctions.”). 
275. Third Amended Administrative Order Prescribing Procedures for Student Loan 
Management Program, supra note 271, ¶¶ 1, 5, 9–11; Adoption of Student Loan Mediation Before 
Litigation Program Procedures, supra note 271, ¶¶ I, III. 
276. Adoption of Student Loan Mediation Before Litigation Program Procedures, supra note 
271, ¶ III(B). 
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apply to nonprofit higher education institutions that contract out all of their services 
to for-profit entities in order to address the concerns discussed above. Each 
component of these definitions is further discussed below.  
The PLMSA expressly excludes government loans made, insured, or 
guaranteed under the Higher Education Act277 and defines private student loans as 
[a loan that] is issued expressly for postsecondary educational expenses to 
a borrower, regardless of whether the loan is provided through the 
educational institution that the subject student attends or directly to the 
borrower from the private educational lender.278 
The PSLMA defines for-profit educational institution by first incorporating the 
definition for higher education as found in the HERA.279 The PSLMA then goes a 
step further to also encompass “private nonprofit institution[s] of higher 
education” to address the problem of a nonprofit substantially operated or 
controlled by a for-profit institution.  
The PSLMA borrows the definition of “private nonprofit institution of higher 
education” as defined by recently amended Maryland Code of Education section 
10-101(k).280 The statute previously defined a “private nonprofit institution of 
higher education” as a higher education that generally limits enrollment to graduates 
of secondary schools and awards degrees at the associate, baccalaureate, or graduate 
level and included an independent institution of higher education within the 
definition.281 House Bill 461 alters the definition of “private nonprofit institution 
of higher education” to mean, in addition to current criteria, that the institution “(i) 
benefits no person through any part of its net earnings; (ii) [i]s legally authorized to 
operate as a nonprofit organization in each state in which it is physically located; 
[and] (iii) [i]s determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be an organization to 
which contributions are tax-deductible . . . .”282 The bill also explicitly states that 
“‘[p]rivate nonprofit institution of higher education’ does not include an institution 
engaging in a reportable incident unless the Commission has determined that the 
incident does not constitute private inurement.”283 The bill goes on to define what 
a reportable incident is and requires the Maryland Higher Education Commission 
(MHEC) to determine whether an incident constitutes private inurement.284 Under 
 
277. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070a, 1070b, 1070d-33, 1070g-1, 1070h, 1071, 1087-53,  
1087a, 1087aa.  
278. See infra Appendix B. 
279. 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)–(3), (b). 
280. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 10-101(k) (West 2019). 
281. 2019 MD. LAWS 3040. 
282. EDUC. § 10-101(k)(1)(i)–(iii).  
283. Id. § 10-101(k)(3). 
284. Id. § 10-101(o) (“‘Reportable Incident’ means any of the following as reportable on a 
private nonprofit institution of higher education’s Form 990 of the Internal Revenue Service: (1) The 
engagement in an excess benefit transaction with a disqualified person; (2) The providing of a grant or 
other assistance by the institution to a member of the governing body; (3) The reporting of receivables 
from or payables to a member of the governing body; (4) The institution was a party to a business 
transaction connected to a member of the institution’s governing body; (5) The institution was a party 
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the Commission’s regulations, institutions are allowed to engage in corrective action 
to have their classification returned to nonprofit status.285  
The bill was brought about in response to the Higher Learning Commission, 
an accreditor, changing their guidelines to allow for an arrangement in which an 
institution set up as a nonprofit may outsource a range of services to a separate  
for-profit company.286 Though, as argued above, the problem of covert nonprofits 
by for-profit institutions is an IRS enforcement issue, states feel obliged to monitor 
covert nonprofit institutions and take certain action to protect students, such as 
requiring an institution to provide financial guarantees.287 Because an institution’s 
status as a nonprofit can evolve throughout its tenure, the PSBPA did not include 
this more expansive definition. However, the PSLMA is applicable on defaulted 
private student loans before legal proceedings are initiated when students may be 
most in need of guarantee funds or other state protections established to benefit 
for-profit school attendees.  
2. Amount in Default 
The PSLMA as proposed in Appendix B is applicable to all private student 
loans from for-profit institutions no matter the amount of default. This is, in large 
part, because of the variability in small claims court civil jurisdiction thresholds 
across the nation.288 Some courts set their threshold as low as $3,500 to as high as 
$25,000.289 Other states, such as California, have an even more complicated small 
claims threshold with exceptions.290 The thresholds of small claims courts are likely 
to influence the scope and application of PSLMA of a particular jurisdiction.  
Another factor to consider is the debt loads of those that are currently 
struggling to make their payments. According to the Federal Reserve Board, of 
those borrowers behind on their payments eighteen percent of borrowers owe less 
than $10,000 of outstanding debt, twenty-two percent owe between $10,000 and 
 
to a prohibited tax shelter transaction; (6) The institution participated in an equity-based compensation 
arrangement; or (7) The institution paid compensation contingent on the revenue of the institution or 
any related organization.”). 
285. MD. CODE REGS. 13B.01.03.07 (2020). 
286. H.B. 461, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/ 
2019RS/fnotes/bil_0001/hb0461.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDE8-8VFM]; see also Mills, supra note 217; 
Shireman, supra note 217, at tbl.1. 
287. Memorandum from Emily A.A. Dow, Ph.D., Assistant Sec’y, Academic Affairs, to  
Md. Higher Educ. Comm., Final Approval of New COMAR Regulations – Private Inurement by 
Nonprofit Institutions of Higher Education 13, 15 ( Jan. 22, 2020), https://mhec.maryland.gov/ 
About/SiteAssets/Lists/Meeting%20Agendas%20and%20Agenda%20Books/EditForm/CommBoo
k1-22-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5AX-W82E]. 
288. WILLIAM E. RAFTERY, CIVIL JURISDICTION THRESHOLDS (2015), 
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/16160/civil-jurisdiction-thresholds-history.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UR9U-6AXP]. 
289. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-503A (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16–15–501(d)(1)  
(West 2009). 
290. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 116.210–116.270 (West 2003). 
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$24,999 of debt, and sixteen percent owe more than $100,000.291 Though these 
numbers are not particular to private student loan debts, they offer some insight on 
the impact on the program size when setting a default threshold amount. 
3. Required Communication and Disclosure 
The PSLMA seeks to bridge this disparity between federal and private student 
loans by providing private student loan borrowers an opportunity to fully discuss 
their repayment plan or loss mitigation options in a facilitated mediation. Facilitated 
mediation, however, would expedite communication between a struggling private 
student loan borrower and their lender by first requiring the lender to send a notice 
of default and right to cure thirty days prior to initiating any legal proceeding. The 
notice will provide essential information to the borrower including the nature of 
default and the specific action required to cure, and provide the borrower an 
opportunity to dispute the default and raise any other defenses. In addition, the 
PSLMA would require an exchange of information prior to the mediation  
session itself. 
The PSLMA would require lenders to disclose to borrowers the loss mitigation 
options available to them. By doing so, the Act lifts the veil of confusion and 
steering of borrowers into more costly options.  
Mediation will also help lenders address the proportionally higher student 
default rates for private loans from for-profit institutions.292 The PSLMA requires 
servicers to fully assess and communicate with student borrowers. With mediation 
acting as a last resort, borrowers will be less likely to default as the borrower works 
together with the lender to revise their repayments and avoid default.  
4. Mediation Costs 
The PSLMA may increase operating costs to lenders and impose minor delays 
before pursuing a default against private borrowers. However, the model act sets 
the cost of facilitated mediation at the current market rate for mediation with both 
parties paying half the cost unless there is a determination by a facilitator that justice 
requires an alternative payment. 
The cost will be further mitigated by fewer defaulting borrowers and a higher 
standard of repayment plans. The private student loan lenders admit that offering 
post-default rehabilitative programs could help banks recover some of the 
 
291. Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2018-May 2019,  
BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2019-economic-
well-being-of-us-households-in-2018-student-loans-and-other-education-debt.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
W2JN-J7CH] (Jan. 30, 2020). 
292. According to the Federal Reserve Board, more than one-fifth of borrowers who attended 
private for-profit institutions are behind on student loan payments, versus eight percent who attended 
public institutions and five percent who attended private not-for-profit institutions. Id. 
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nonperforming debt and could be marketed to borrowers as a benefit offered by 
the bank.293 
It can also help loan servicers improve their overall service performance which 
could ultimately avoid them having to pay millions in penalties.294 This assertion is 
supported by the research evaluating foreclosure mediation programs, which 
evaluated five years of foreclosure data and strongly suggested that the marginal 
delay for well-run mediation programs imposes modest costs, particularly compared 
to the benefits of successful mediation.295 Regrettably, there is no true cost-benefit 
analysis because of the variability of mediation programs and student loan servicer 
loss mitigation options. But much could have been said of foreclosure mediation 
programs, yet all subsequent analysis supports the cost effectiveness of mediation.  
5. Good Faith Requirement 
Every contract governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has an 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing (section 1-304). Private lenders must show 
good faith and fair dealing to avoid misleading or defrauding borrowers, similar to 
common commercial standards. At or before the mediation, lenders must make 
diligent efforts to inform the borrower of foreseeable duties and consequences for 
each available option offered by the private student loan lender. Inclusion of a good 
faith requirement within the Private Student Mediation Act is an essential 
component to achieve the prodding function that will require student loan services 
to fully evaluate borrowers for options when there is no other incentive for them 
to do so.  
However, the Uniform Mediation Act emphasizes the confidentiality of 
mediators, which may limit their ability to report on the level of engagement of the 
parties in the process.296 Even though most foreclosure programs keep the financial 
and policy records confidential, the concern is that requiring mediators to report on 
how forthcoming the parties were within mediation will hamper the parties’ 
willingness to participate and jeopardize the mediator’s neutrality.  
But an evaluation of the good faith requirement as applied in foreclosure 
mediation instead emphasizes the need for clear requirements and expectations 
within the rules to ensure enforceability and accountability. 
“New York and Nevada are the two states with the most reported cases 
applying a broad duty to negotiate in good faith . . . in [which] virtually all cases” tie 
 
293. GAO-19-430, supra note 16, at 12. 
294. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013 ¶¶ 73, 79 (Aug. 22, 2016), in 
which Wells Fargo was required to pay $3.6 Million penalty to the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau and $410,000 in consumer refunds.  
295. White, supra note 253, at 11.  
296. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2003) 
(“Unless subject to the [insert statutory references to open meetings act and open records act], 
mediation communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other 
law or rule of this State.”). 
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servicer misconduct “either to violations of specific program requirements . . . or 
to some type of misrepresentation.”297 In fact, New York amended the Mandatory 
Settlement Conference Act in 2009 to expressly require good faith negotiation.298 
This legislation was passed in part because “[a]s the mortgage crisis 
. . . worsened . . . it . . . bec[a]me evident that more must be accomplished to protect 
New Yorkers in these difficult times and beyond.” 299 Once the law was passed a 
lower New York state court stated it had an “affirmative obligation to ensure that 
the primary statutory goal of keeping homeowners in their homes, and the 
concomitant obligation of ensuring that the parties act in good faith, are met.”300 
Given that the complaints surrounding private student loan servicing echo the same 
concerns raised by homeowners during the foreclosure crisis, one could argue 
mediation could be equally effective in ensuring borrowers are fully evaluated for 
all their options. 
Common problems in foreclosure mediation programs echo the concerns of 
student loan borrowers in dealing with their servicers, such as not appearing “with 
an authorized representative who could make decisions on loss mitigation 
questions,” unduly delaying application decisions, or failing “to give reasonable 
explanations for their decisions,”301 all of which resulted in sanctions against the 
servicers for failing to mediate in good faith.  
Such findings have been imposed whether or not there has been an underlying 
modification program in which mortgage servicers must offer. The Suffolk County 
Supreme Court sanctioned a subprime lender that appeared at a settlement 
conference with “no good faith intention whatsoever of resolving [the] matter in 
any manner other than a complete and forcible devolution of title . . . .”302 Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes illustrates the court’s frustration and ability to hold 
servicers accountable when they fail to adhere to the purpose of the mediation 
enabling statutes: 
The terms of the proposed Modification Agreement, particularly but not 
exclusively the inclusion of an adjustable rate component, are unacceptable 
 
297. White, supra note 253, at 24. Violations of program requirements include “timely 
participation, timely action on, and accurate communication regarding homeowner loss mitigation 
applications.” Id. 
298. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(f) (McKinney 2017). 
299. Wells Fargo Bank v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (quoting S. ASSEMB. 
B. 236-507, 7th Sess., at 9 (N.Y. 2009), http://digitalcollections.archives.nysed.gov/index.php/Detail/
objects/22742 [https://perma.cc/RXZ8-2AFN]). 
300. Bank of Am. v. Rausher, 981 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (citations omitted). 
301. GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., REBUILDING AMERICA: HOW STATES CAN 
SAVE MILLIONS OF HOMES THROUGH FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 7 (2012) (“Sanctions have 
included monetary penalties, orders for servicers to bring in a qualified representative to negotiate, 
orders tolling accrual of interest and fees during periods of delay, and orders to modify a loan.”). Some 
courts have gone as far as prohibiting a foreclosure sale or dismissing a judicial foreclosure case with 
prejudice, thus preventing the servicer from re-filing the claim. Id. 
302. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (applying 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1 (1998)). 
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to this Court. The proposed Modification Agreement flies in the face of 
the . . . legislation . . . which was designed to assist borrowers in 
foreclosure cases to remain in their homes and to prevent a foreclosure 
crisis like the one currently gripping this state and the nation from 
reoccurring in the future. 303  
The court went on to find “Wells Fargo has acted in bad faith and contrary to 
CPLR § 3408 by presenting Hughes with the Modification Agreement [with an 
adjustable rate and unaffordable payment] . . . and, notwithstanding, the Court’s 
directive, obstinately refusing to revise its terms in accordance with the stated 
intention of the Legislature.”304 
However the courts are limited in the sanction they can impose as they cannot 
change the settlement parameters of the parties or require particular contract 
terms.305 In fact, “a determination not to modify a mortgage loan by a foreclosing 
bank that is under no legal obligation to modify such a loan . . . does not constitute 
bad faith.”306  
Though the PSLMA may shed light on the inconsistent and unfair practices 
of the private student loan servicers and even raise the status quo of industry 
practice, it is just one of the tools to help the most vulnerable student borrowers 
that have otherwise been ignored by regulators.  
D. Constitutional Validity of the PSLMA 
Though this proposal would have a retroactive effect upon all private student 
loan contracts in collection, mandatory mediation before collecting a student loan 
default does not impair the obligation of contracts.307 Though a retroactive law that 
deprives a person of a vested property right may constitute a taking,308 “[t]he 
threshold inquiry is ‘whether state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial 
impairment of a contractual relationship.’”309  
The next step, as specified by the Supreme Court, is to apply a level of scrutiny 
proportional to the magnitude of the contractual burden identified in the first step. 
“If the state regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the State, in 
justification, must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the 
regulation,” and then after “a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the next 
inquiry is whether the adjustment . . . ‘[is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] 
of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation’s 
 
303. 897 N.Y.S.2d. at 609. 
304. Id. 
305. Negron v. Woodhull Hosp., 173 F. App’x. 77, 79 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] party is not 
required to change its settlement parameters by reason of a court order to attend a settlement 
conference.”). 
306. See JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ilardo, 940 N.Y.S.2d 829, 843–44 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
307. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
308. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
309. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) (quoting 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)).  
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adoption].’”310 In Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, the Supreme Court found 
that since “the contract clause is not an absolute and utterly unqualified restriction 
of the States’ protective power,” the state was justified in passing legislation to 
protect the vital and basic interests of the community especially when the legislation 
was connected to the interests of all parties affected.311  
“[S]tate regulation that restricts a party to gains it reasonably expected from 
the contract does not necessarily constitute a substantial impairment.”312 One factor 
in determining the extent of the impairment is whether or not the industry “has 
been regulated in the past.”313 Since 1965, with the enactment of Higher Education 
Act, the student loan market has been regulated. While this Act primarily served to 
provide protections for federal student aid, it also puts restrictions on funding for 
for-profit private student loans and increases the pressure on these schools from 
attaining funds from nonfederal sources. But this is just one act in a heavily 
regulated industry as evidenced by the HEA Reauthorization Act (1972), Student 
Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (2010), and Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA). 
Federal courts have permitted retroactive application of civil legislation 
without finding a violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.314 Therefore, 
as currently applied by the federal courts, the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause jurisprudence “opens a door for constraints on retroactivity but will 
only apply in relatively extreme cases.”315 A taking of a contract can occur when the 
government itself seizes the rights of the parties under the contract.316 The test, as 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Omnia Commercial Co., is whether the 
government has “appropriated” the parties’ contractual rights or merely 
“frustrated” them.317 These cases deal with the “taking” of a contract right after it 
has been created, and not with the “taking” of the right to contract freely. A state 
 
310. Id. at 411–12. (alteration in original). 
311. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934). In this case, the Act 
allowed for an extension of the redemption period for foreclosure sales. Id. at 416. 
312. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc., 459 U.S. at 411 (citing U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431  
U.S. 1, 31 (1977); El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965)). 
313. Id. (citing Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 242 n.13; Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan 
Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940)). 
314. See Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961, 968–70 (9th Cir. 1999); Willoughby  
Dev. Corp. v. Ravalli Cnty., 338 F. App’x 581, 583 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416, 422 
(7th Cir. 1989); Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 370–72 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  
315. WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 677 (3d ed. 2011). 
316. When the government, for war purposes, requisitioned the entire production of a steel 
manufacturer, rendering impossible and unlawful performance of an outstanding contract between the 
manufacturer and a customer, the customer’s rights were not taken by the government, but frustrated 
by its lawful action. Omnia Com. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 513 (1923); cf. Lynch v. United 
States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (“The Fifth Amendment commands that property be not taken without 
making just compensation. Valid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, 
municipality, a state, or the United States.”). 
317. Omnia Com. Co., 261 U.S. at 511–12. 
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shall not pass a law revoking, invalidating, or altering a contract, but a court may 
order mediation or other alternative dispute resolution as a process step to invoking 
the judicial system for powers of collection. Similar to court-ordered pretrial 
alternative dispute resolution, mediation of private student loan debt collections 
allows an impartial third party to facilitate communication and ensure good faith 
requirements have been met. 
CONCLUSION 
Private student loan borrowers do not have the right typically afforded to 
debtors with unsecured loans to discharge debt in bankruptcy, nor do they have the 
multitude of repayment and discharge rights afforded to federal student loan 
borrowers. For-profit higher education students have for decades been subject to 
abusive and deceptive practices. The intersection of these groups—for-profit 
school students with private education debt—consists of a group in substantial need 
of new consumer protections.  
This Article has set forth two model laws that states may enact to bring 
protections to these forgotten borrowers. First, new private student loans entered 
into by for-profit school borrowers could include many of the protections given to 
federal student loan borrowers through the use of mandated contract terms under 
state law. Second, private student loans to for-profit school students that end in 
default should be enforceable only if the lender engages in mediation in an effort to 
reach a loan modification or other settlement of the outstanding debt. We rely on 
successful federal and state consumer protections—the FTC Holder Rule and state 
foreclosure mediation laws—as support for the workability of the concepts 
underlying these proposals.  
  
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APPENDIX A: MODEL ACT #1 
PRIVATE STUDENT BORROWER PROTECTION ACT 
Section 1. Citation. Sections _ to _ shall be cited as the [state] Private Student 
Borrower Protection Act. 
Section 2. Scope and Application. The following words and terms where 
used in the [state] Private Student Borrower Protection Act shall have the meanings 
ascribed to them in this section. 
“Covered loan” means a private student loan to a covered student.  
“Covered student” means a student attending a proprietary institution— 
i. and the proprietary institution has a physical presence in this state; or 
ii. the student is a resident of this state, as defined under [insert]318, and the 
proprietary institution provides the course of study for the student through  
distance education. 
“Distance education” means [insert].319 
“Federal student loan” means a student loan made by the United States 
government or any agency of the United States government.  
“Lender” means a person who makes a covered loan. 
“Physical presence” [insert].320 
“Private student loan” means a loan that is a qualified education loan, as 
defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a 
debtor who is an individual, unless that educational loan is made, insured, or 
guaranteed by a governmental unit, including a federal student loan, or is made 
under any program funded in whole or in part by a government unit or a nonprofit 
institution substantially affiliated with a government unit.321  
“Proprietary institution” means a higher educational institution in any  
State that— 
i. meets the definition of a “proprietary institution of higher education” in 20 
U.S.C. § 1002(b); or 
 
318. A state should adopt an appropriate definition of residency by reference to existing  
state law. 
319. Most states have existing law defining “distance education,” “physical presence,” or 
analogous concepts. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-13-325 (West 2009). The National Council for 
State Authorization Reciprocity Agreements offers model definitions for these terms. NAT’L COUNCIL 
FOR STATE AUTHORIZATION RECIPROCITY AGREEMENTS, supra note 229, § 1, at 11 (“‘Distance 
Education’ means: instruction offered by any means where the student and faculty member are in 
separate physical locations. It includes, but is not limited to, online, interactive video and 
correspondence courses or programs.”). Physical presence is discussed at length in the SARA Manual. 
Id. § 5.10, at 40–41. 
320. See supra note 319. 
321. This language is adapted from the bankruptcy discharge exception provision. See 11  
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
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ii. is a nonprofit institution substantially operated or controlled by a for-profit 
institution and would meet the definition of a “proprietary institution of higher 
education” in 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b) except for being a nonprofit institution. 
Section 3. Required Rights in Loan Contract. In connection with the 
origination of any covered loan, the lender shall include in the loan contract the 
following provisions: 
“For purposes of these contract provisions required under the [state] Private 
Student Borrower Protection Act, ‘federal student loan’ means student loan made 
by the United States government. 
“Eligibility for Federal Student Loan Discharge. Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this contract to the contrary, any holder of this loan contract shall 
accept as full payment and satisfaction of all obligations of the borrower any of  
the following: 
“(1) Either: (a) proof that the borrower has obtained a discharge of a federal 
student loan for reason of death or disability; or (b) proof equivalent to that required 
for a borrower to discharge a federal student loan for reason of death or disability 
under 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a) or regulations adopted thereunder.  
“(2) Either: (a) proof that the borrower has obtained a discharge of a federal 
student loan for reason of the closure of the school attended or false certification 
of eligibility for a federal loan; or (b) proof equivalent to that required for a borrower 
to discharge a federal student loan for reason of school closure under 20  
U.S.C. § 1087(c) or regulations adopted thereunder. 
“Alternative Income-Based Repayment. Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this contract to the contrary, the borrower shall not be in default if the borrower 
makes periodic payments on this loan equal to the share available to the holder of this 
contract of the private student loan repayment limit. For purposes of this provision, the 
private student loan repayment limit shall be equal to thirty percent of the periodic 
amount owed by the borrower on an income-based repayment program under 
which the borrower is obligated to repay all of the borrower’s federal student loans, 
except that this amount shall be calculated as the amount that would have been due 
to be repaid on the federal student loans through income-based repayment without 
regard to any prepayment of the federal student loans. For purposes of this 
provision, the share available to the holder of this contract shall be the private student loan 
repayment limit minus any periodic payments due by the borrower for this alternative 
income-based repayment for any private student loan originated at a date prior to 
the date of origination of this loan. If the borrower did not obtain federal student 
loans to the attend the school for which proceeds of this loan were used to attend, 
the borrower shall not be in default if the borrower makes periodic payments on 
this loan equal to thirty percent of the periodic payments that would have been due 
for a federal student loan of the same amount under the Pay as You Earn program 
described in 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a).” 
Section 4. Format of Required Provisions. The contract provisions 
required by Section 3 shall be in at least 12-point type with italics and underline as 
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provided in Section 3. The contract provisions required by Section 3 shall be on a 
separate page from all other contract language except the provisions required, if any, 
under the Federal Trade Commission Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and 
Defenses rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 433. The separate page with the required contract 
provisions shall include the following heading in 14-point, boldface type: “Your 
Right to Alternative Loan Repayment and Discharge Under the [State 
Name] Private Student Borrower Protection Act.” 
Section 5. Deception or Overshadowing. No covered lender, proprietary 
institution, or other person shall, in connection with a covered loan, engage in 
statements or conduct that deceive or mislead persons provided or offered a 
covered loan about the rights provided under the Private Student Borrower 
Protection Act. 
Section 6. Enforcement. Failure to include in a covered loan the contract 
provisions required by Section 3, breach of any of the contract provisions required 
by Section 3, or any other violation of the Private Student Borrower Protection Act 
shall constitute a violation of [state UDAP law].322  
  
 
322. Insert a reference to the appropriate state UDAP law and any corresponding public or 
private enforcement provisions, as appropriate. 
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APPENDIX B: MODEL ACT #2 
PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN MEDIATION ACT 
Section 1. Citation. Sections _ to _ shall be cited as the [state] Private Student 
Loan Mediation Act. 
Section 2. Scope and Application. The following words and terms where 
used in sections _ to _ shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this Section. 
This legislation applies to Private Education Loans that are provided by For-Profit 
Higher Education Institutions and Nonprofit Higher Education Institutions that 
contract out all of their services to for-profit entities. The term “for-profit higher 
education institution” means an educational institution in any state that— 
i. falls under the definition of higher education as found in 20  
U.S.C. § 1002(b);323  
ii.  institution engaging in a reportable incident unless the [state commission] 
has determined that the incident does not constitute private inurement. 
Section 3. Definitions. 
1. Facilitated Mediation. A conference at which the parties in dispute over 
the collection of a private educational loan debt, their attorneys, additional 
representatives of the parties, or a combination of those persons appear before a 
facilitator to discuss the positions of the parties in an attempt to reach agreement 
on a loss mitigation program for the student borrower and lender. 
2. Loss Mitigation Program. An alternative payment structure offered in 
connection with an attempt to repay a private educational loan that: 
Protects the Borrower from the adverse effects of default on private education 
loans, including, but not limited to: 
Negative credit reporting; 
Accelerated payments; and 
Collection actions; 
Accounts for the borrower’s ability to reasonably repay the private educational 
loan, considering 
 Adjusted gross income; 
 Local cost of living; and 
 Other factors contributing to financial hardship. 
3. Private Educational Lender (Lender). Any person, its agents, 
subsidiaries, or affiliates engaged in the business of soliciting, making, servicing, 
collecting, or extending private education loans. 
4. Private Education Loans. A loan provided by a private educational  
lender that— 
(i) is not made, insured, or guaranteed under of title IV of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.);  
 
323. Language taken from the Higher Education Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b). 
First to Printer_Cox, Fox & Tutt_SS Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  9:45 AM 
100 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:43 
(ii) is issued expressly for postsecondary educational expenses to a borrower, 
regardless of whether the loan is provided through the educational institution that 
the subject student attends or directly to the borrower from the private  
educational lender; 
. 
5. Facilitator. A natural person who is trained to mediate disputes but may 
inform and discuss with both parties the rights of each party.  
6. Default. The nonpayment of a debt obligation within the contractually 
obligated period, but before any negative action has been taken on the Borrower. 
7. Borrower. A natural person who has agreed to take out the Private 
Education Loan and is obligated to make repayment on the Private Education Loan. 
8. Good Faith. Means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing. 
Section 4. Prohibited Acts, Notice of Default, Right to Cure. 
a. No Lender may initiate any legal proceeding based upon the collection of a 
debt against Borrower until thirty days after Lender sends separately to Borrower a 
written notice of default and right to cure. 
b. The notice under this section must state— 
i. the nature of the default, including a statement, as of the date of the notice, 
of all past-due payments, fees, and other charges owed to the Lender; 
ii. the specific action the Borrower must take to cure any curable default, 
including the exact amount that must be paid, all payment methods permitted by 
Section __, and any other payment method acceptable to the Lender; 
iii. the date by which the default must be cured, which may not be fewer than 
thirty days after the date the notice is sent; 
iv. the effect of curing the default, including the right to have the obligation 
remain in effect; 
v. that Borrower may dispute the default and raise any other defense or 
payment of the obligation or the manner of exercising those rights; 
vi. the name of: 
 (1) Lender and the facts that establish Lender’s right to collect under  
Section __; 
 (2) the legal owner of the obligation, if Lender is not the legal owner; 
 (3) that Borrower may request a copy of the negotiable instrument or other 
evidence of the obligation and a copy of any record that demonstrates the right to 
foreclose; and 
 (4) if Borrower is relying on a lost, destroyed, or stolen negotiable 
instrument, the information required by Section _. 
c. The notice under this Section may contain additional information, including 
a statement that additional amounts will come due after the date of the notice. 
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Section 5. Notice of Mediation. 
Before commencing any legal proceeding against Borrower, Private 
Educational Lender shall— 
i. request under Subsection (2) that the Facilitator send the Borrower notice 
of the right to participate in Facilitated Mediation; or 
ii. send the notice under Subsection (3). 
If the Facilitator establishes a procedure for sending the notice required by 
Subsection (a) or (b), the Lender shall request the Facilitator to send the notice to 
the Borrower and the Facilitator shall promptly send the notice. 
If the Facilitator does not establish a procedure for sending notice required by 
Subsection (a) or (b), the Lender shall send notice to Borrower— 
i. by first-class certified mail addressed to Borrower at the Borrower’s last 
known address; and 
ii. by electronic mail to Borrower’s electronic mail address. 
A notice under this section of the right to participate in Facilitated Mediation 
must include the following: 
i. the name, address, telephone number, and electronic-mail address of  
the Lender; 
ii. a statement that the Borrower may request Facilitated Mediation and that 
the request must be made not later than thirty days after notice is sent; 
iii. the instructions for requesting Facilitated Mediation and all eligibility 
requirements under the Facilitator’s rules; 
iv. a description of all documents that the Facilitator’s rules require the 
Borrower to bring to the Facilitated Meditation; and 
v. a form prescribed by the Facilitator for the Borrower to request Facilitated 
Mediation and to affirm that the Borrower meets the eligibility requirements of 
Section _. 
Section 6. Process for Facilitated Mediation. 
Borrower has thirty days to agree to the notice of mediation as proscribed in 
Section _. 
If Borrower accepts the opportunity to participate in facilitated meditation, 
the Private Educational Lender must notify Borrower and communicate with 
Borrower to determine a reasonable time within thirty days to schedule the 
facilitated mediation. 
Parties must schedule Facilitated Mediation for a period no sooner than thirty 
days after the agreed schedule date. 
Parties have until one week prior to the scheduled Facilitated Mediation to 
provide the opposing party with copies of all documents that will be used at 
Facilitated Mediation to show— 
i. ownership of the loan; 
ii. description and eligibility criteria for any private loan loss  
mitigation options; 
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iii. current income of Borrower; 
iv. current assets of Borrower; and 
v. other documents necessary in order to resolve the dispute and determine an 
appropriate loss mitigation program. 
All parties involved in the mediation outside of the Facilitator must have 
authority to settle the dispute for their respective side. 
If Borrower rejects the opportunity to participate in Facilitated Mediations, 
the Borrower must notify Private Educational Lender in writing; and 
Private Educational Lender must retain the rejection notification for its 
records for a period of [insert legal record keeping statute reference]. 
If Private Educational Lender is unable to obtain a rejection notification, 
[rebuttable presumption that lender did not attempt to offer facilitated mediation in 
good faith].  
If Borrower and Private Educational Lender cannot reach an agreed mediation 
date within the period noted in Part 2 and failure was due to— 
Private Educational Lender 
 Then Private Educational Lender may not attempt to collect on the debt. 
Borrower 
 Then Private Educational Lender has a presumption of a good faith attempt 
at mediation. 
Section 7. Resolution of Facilitated Mediation. If parties reach an 
agreement in Good Faith Facilitated Mediation, Private Educational Lender must 
file the agreement with the court clerk. 
Section 8. Funding. 
The cost of Facilitated Mediation will be based upon the current market rate 
for mediation services. 
Borrower and Private Educational Lender must each pay half of the cost of 
Facilitated Mediation unless the Facilitator determines justice requires an  
alternative payment. 
Section 9. Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
A Private Educational Lender whose conduct is governed by this Act shall 
comply in good faith and fair dealing with the requirements throughout the entire 
lending process, including, but not limited to negotiating process, lending process, 
and debt collection process. 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every lending contract, 
even though sometimes not mentioned in the contract. 
A Private Educational Lender shall be honest in fact and proceed in a 
commercially reasonable manner of fair dealing in complying with this Act. Factors 
determining “fair dealing” includes, but not limited to—  
i. parties having the authority to settle the dispute at the facilitated mediation; 
ii. parties making reasonable effort to communicate with each other and settle 
the dispute;  
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iii. litigation is only allowed after parties’ efforts to negotiate fail and the 
settlement agreement seems reasonably futile; and 
iv. Private Educational Lender shall not exercise any undue influence 
throughout the entire lending process. 
If a Private Educational Lender proves to follow business norms in a 
reasonable manner by a preponderance of evidence, a breach of good faith and fair 
dealing requirement cannot be found. 
Unless otherwise stipulated, a breach of good faith and fair dealing cannot be 
an independent cause of action; but a breach of covenant of implied good faith and 
fair dealing can be a cause of action. 
Unless otherwise stipulated, the duty of good faith and fair dealing shall 
continue until the lending contract is fully performed. 
Section 10. Civil Action, Remedies. 
Cause of Action. If a Private Educational Lender violates any provision of 
sections _ to _, Borrower may bring an injunction action to prevent collection of 
the Private Educational Loan and may be awarded attorney’s fees and costs. 
Damages. If a court finds repeated attempts to collect on a Private 
Educational Loan that does not satisfy the requirements of sections _ to _, during 
the cure period, while Facilitated Mediation is pending, or after being enjoined, the 
violating party will be liable for— 
i. actual damages;  
ii. statutory damages of [insert viable amount]; 
iii. attorney’s fees; 
iv. costs and disbursements; and 
v. any other equitable relief as determined by the court. 
  
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